Because of means that the protected characteristic has to be “the reason” for the less favourable treatment: Essop v Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017] UKSC 27, paragraph 17. It is not sufficient for the protected characteristic to simply be part of the background context or circumstances in which the treatment occurred.
Because of at stage 4 means that the “something arising” operated on the mind of the person making the decision (consciously or sub-consciously) to a significant (that is material) extent. See Lord Justice Underhill at paragraph 17 of IPC Media Limited v Millar UKEAT/0395/12 SM and at paragraph 25. The Tribunal, as its starting point, has to identify the individual(s) responsible for the decision or act or behaviour or failure to act which is being complained about.
Because of at stage 4 means that the “something arising” operated on the mind of the person making the decision (consciously or sub-consciously) to a significant (that is material) extent. See Lord Justice Underhill at paragraph 17 of IPC Media Limited v Millar UKEAT/0395/12 SM and at paragraph 25. The Tribunal, as its starting point, has to identify the individual(s) responsible for the decision or act or behaviour or failure to act which is being complained about. It does not matter whether the putative employer has knowledge that the something arose in consequence of disability, provided there is knowledge of the disability itself - City of York v Grosset [2016] ICR 1492 CA. See also the full guidance in Pnaiser v NHS England [2016] IRLR 710 EAT at 31. “A Tribunal may ask why A treated the claimant in the unfavourable way alleged....alternatively it might ask whether the disability has a particular consequence for a claimant that leads to “something” that caused the unfavourable treatment”. Motive for the unfavourable treatment (even if benign) is irrelevant.
More Definitions of Because of
Because of means “based on” and “‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship”). Courts assume that but-for causation “is one of the traditional background principles against which Congress legislate[s],” and that a phrase such as “due to” or “because of” “imposes a requirement of but-for causation.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The WARN Act’s phrase “due to” means but-for causation.11
Because of knowledge" or "materiality" qualifications set forth therein, but would have constituted a breach of such representations and warranties if the "knowledge" or "materiality" qualifications were not contained therein.
Because of means no more or less than it does elsewhere in the 2010 Act. The relevant proscribed reason (in this case the protected act) must have some material effect on the decisions, acts or omissions that make up the detriment. As ever, it is open to us to conclude the actual reason where that is clear on the facts. Otherwise, we apply section 136 of the 2010 Act. If the claimant proves facts from which we could conclude the proscribed factors were material, we must so conclude unless the respondent can show it is in no way whatsoever because of that reason. (Royal Mail Group Limited v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33)
Because of means “by reason of; on account of.” Webster’s New World Dictionary of the Am. Language 131 (C. ed. 1960); see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (same definition in other con- temporaneous dictionaries). As this Court has long recognized, an action is “because of” sex where it would not have occurred “but for that person’s sex.” Man- hart, 435 U.S. at 711 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Gross, 557 U.S. at 176; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350-52 (2013).3 Thus, where an employer takes an adverse
Because of means: the relevant protected category cannot be “a substantial contributing factor” or “a motivating factor” in the decision/action
Because of a protected characteristic means the characteristic needs to be a cause of the less favourable treatment but does not need to be the only or even the main cause. The question can be phrased as what was the effective cause of the treatment? Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan London Borough regional transport 1999 ICR 877HL identified the crucial question in every case was more simply “why the complainant received the less favourable treatment…. Was it on the grounds of race (here sex) or was it for some other reason, for instance because the complainant was not so well-qualified for the job”
Because of in the statutory language means but for – so the dissent keeps with the statutory meaning