{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "9ZwP9F2J1hS", "uri": "/contracts/9ZwP9F2J1hS#security-analysis", "label": "Password Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 21.3449077606, "published": true}, {"hash": "fjb7WPpEsab", "uri": "/contracts/fjb7WPpEsab#security-analysis", "label": "Password Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 21.1724853516, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "security-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [37, 48]}, {"key": "proposed-scheme", "type": "clause", "offset": [53, 68]}, {"key": "our-scheme", "type": "definition", "offset": [258, 268]}, {"key": "user-authentication", "type": "clause", "offset": [293, 312]}, {"key": "key-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [317, 330]}], "snippet": "In this section, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme. The main assumption for guarantee of security lies in:\n1) The elliptic-curve Diffie\u2013\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 problem is hard;\n2) The hash function h ( ) is the pseudorandom permutation for key derivation; Our scheme can achieve the goal of user authentication and key agreement with great assurance and certainly can prevent the well-known attacks, such as the replay, parallel session, reflection, interleaving, and man-in-the-middle attacks.", "hash": "f7db4a1b1f2943f0e94f2040d1a77ec3", "id": 1}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "fqyjq0JK4Rw", "uri": "/contracts/fqyjq0JK4Rw#security-analysis", "label": "Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 24.2361392975, "published": true}, {"hash": "au2UAW5J6gG", "uri": "/contracts/au2UAW5J6gG#security-analysis", "label": "Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 24.2361392975, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "informal-security-analysis", "type": "clause", "offset": [6, 32]}, {"key": "replay-attack", "type": "clause", "offset": [65, 78]}, {"key": "in-order-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [264, 275]}, {"key": "remote-user", "type": "definition", "offset": [343, 354]}], "snippet": "5.1.1 Informal security analysis Theoretical security analysis \u2022 Replay attack: the replay attack can be dangerous for such a scheme. In fact, a replay attack occurs when an attacker intercepts a previous message exchanged by a sensor node, and tries to replay it in order to impersonate the sensor node, respectively the gateway node, or the remote user. For this reason, we must take seriously the", "hash": "60922b2e5f4f09756fe563923869c35b", "id": 2}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "kYePoDhHJrQ", "uri": "/contracts/kYePoDhHJrQ#security-analysis", "label": "Thesis Submission Agreement", "score": 30.8583374023, "published": true}, {"hash": "5l7tDVl4Vq8", "uri": "/contracts/5l7tDVl4Vq8#security-analysis", "label": "Master's Thesis", "score": 29.5142288208, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "this-chapter", "type": "definition", "offset": [3, 15]}, {"key": "security-features", "type": "clause", "offset": [34, 51]}, {"key": "we-provide", "type": "clause", "offset": [100, 110]}, {"key": "security-level", "type": "clause", "offset": [152, 166]}, {"key": "forward-secrecy", "type": "clause", "offset": [202, 217]}, {"key": "group-operations", "type": "clause", "offset": [238, 254]}], "snippet": "In this chapter, we go trough the security features that our base protocol in [11] pro- vides. Then we provide proofs that B-GKAP also assures the same security level for back- \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 confidentiality and forward secrecy features of dynamic group operations as in the base protocol. Finally, we discuss security models of B-GKAP1 and B-GKAP2.", "hash": "5f34d7472a37a8d4ffece4dfaa22892a", "id": 3}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "6oHyrGdSonl", "uri": "/contracts/6oHyrGdSonl#security-analysis", "label": "Research Paper", "score": 32.191619873, "published": true}, {"hash": "csrefOTfhN7", "uri": "/contracts/csrefOTfhN7#security-analysis", "label": "Research Paper", "score": 26.0390148163, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "on-security", "type": "clause", "offset": [19, 30]}, {"key": "ssl-encryption", "type": "clause", "offset": [102, 116]}, {"key": "ssl-certificate", "type": "definition", "offset": [148, 163]}, {"key": "these-terms", "type": "clause", "offset": [214, 225]}, {"key": "traditional-method", "type": "definition", "offset": [347, 365]}, {"key": "to-generate", "type": "definition", "offset": [366, 377]}, {"key": "very-large", "type": "definition", "offset": [391, 401]}, {"key": "the-ecc", "type": "clause", "offset": [575, 582]}, {"key": "the-information", "type": "clause", "offset": [718, 733]}, {"key": "security-solutions", "type": "definition", "offset": [824, 842]}, {"key": "terms-of-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [1008, 1020]}, {"key": "length-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [1021, 1030]}, {"key": "table-1", "type": "clause", "offset": [1090, 1097]}, {"key": "according-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [1098, 1110]}, {"key": "national-institute-of-standards-and-technology", "type": "definition", "offset": [1130, 1176]}, {"key": "terms-of-security", "type": "clause", "offset": [1399, 1416]}, {"key": "ratio-of-a", "type": "clause", "offset": [1475, 1485]}], "snippet": "This section focus on security analysis that comprises the cryptographic algorithm and protocols like SSL encryption, RSA, and ECC. While buying an SSL certificate, you should have a clear understanding of both of these terms. It may be utilized for the creation of smaller, more efficient, and much faster cryptography keys. Instead of using the traditional method to generate a product of very large prime numbers, it uses an elliptic curve equation to generate keys. ECC is used in the well-known cryptocurrency (i.e. Bitcoin etc). For hackers, it is really hard to crack the ECC algorithm that operates upon the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The ECC certificate has often smaller size because the information that is needed for exchanging for validation is less. For organizations having long- term security solutions as a primary concern, ECC may be an ideal choice. Also, hybrid SSLs can be utilized to use ECC instead of RSA-trusted root keys. A simple comparison can be shown in terms of the length of ciphering key between the RSA and the ECC can be stated in Table 1 according to the NIST (i.e. the National Institute of Standards and Technology) 31. Table 1. Comparison between RSA and ECC key strength32. 3 3072 256 4 7680 384 5 15360 521 Here is a quick comparison between RSA and ECC according to the NIST publication. It will help us to decide which is better in terms of security. From the above Table 1, this research concludes that the ratio of a key in size and its strength for the ECC compared with RSA is as follows: No.1 (1:7), No.2 (1:10), No.3 (1:12), No.4 (1:20), No.5 (1:30).", "hash": "2289cc2a36d2568b7413e923cf563206", "id": 4}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "59B4USGX2R4", "uri": "/contracts/59B4USGX2R4#security-analysis", "label": "Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 24.9154510498, "published": true}, {"hash": "3Ga8nmqEm88", "uri": "/contracts/3Ga8nmqEm88#security-analysis", "label": "Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 21.9582481384, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-security", "type": "clause", "offset": [22, 34]}, {"key": "the-proposed-scheme", "type": "clause", "offset": [47, 66]}, {"key": "no-requirement", "type": "clause", "offset": [78, 92]}, {"key": "time-synchronization", "type": "clause", "offset": [103, 123]}, {"key": "forward-secrecy", "type": "clause", "offset": [135, 150]}, {"key": "replay-attack", "type": "clause", "offset": [207, 220]}], "snippet": "This section provides the security analysis of the proposed scheme focused on no requirement of global time synchronization, providing forward secrecy provision, and secure against password guessing attack, replay attack and user identity guessing attack.", "hash": "d75408d04e9523786d4667ccb53b1d03", "id": 5}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "7X4cv2RMCX7", "uri": "/contracts/7X4cv2RMCX7#security-analysis", "label": "Password Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 26.7392223655, "published": true}, {"hash": "5PSZ8JNPRnz", "uri": "/contracts/5PSZ8JNPRnz#security-analysis", "label": "Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 24.8699512482, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-security", "type": "clause", "offset": [28, 40]}, {"key": "proposed-protocol", "type": "clause", "offset": [48, 65]}, {"key": "the-protocol", "type": "clause", "offset": [134, 146]}], "snippet": "In this section, we discuss the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some possible attacks, then evaluating the security of the protocol.", "hash": "ac093e4fed3fc49cd970c58b7eb2f925", "id": 6}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "kdW2O5YSB7D", "uri": "/contracts/kdW2O5YSB7D#security-analysis", "label": "Latency First Smart Contract", "score": 30.1202030182, "published": true}, {"hash": "iHCrDlDVCMd", "uri": "/contracts/iHCrDlDVCMd#security-analysis", "label": "Latency First Smart Contract", "score": 29.778011322, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-assumption", "type": "clause", "offset": [33, 47]}], "snippet": "A A A A A A\nTheorem III.1. Under the assumption that the hash function satisfies the second preimage security, the probability of successfully performing the dependency attack is negligible.", "hash": "50b66e5f734c7cc0583c77abc140e6ab", "id": 7}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "59hA8rkeXt0", "uri": "/contracts/59hA8rkeXt0#security-analysis", "label": "Privacy Preserving Authenticated Key Agreement", "score": 30.4887313843, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "terms-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [43, 51]}, {"key": "replay-attack", "type": "clause", "offset": [78, 91]}, {"key": "smart-card", "type": "definition", "offset": [104, 114]}], "snippet": "This section provides security analysis in terms of password guessing attack, replay attack and stolen- smart card attack.", "hash": "b01c372e986b141949e63c35a0bcbd8d", "id": 8}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "lx1Rih9NjW2", "uri": "/contracts/lx1Rih9NjW2#security-analysis", "label": "Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 20.5284671783, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "work-on", "type": "definition", "offset": [56, 63]}, {"key": "proposed-scheme", "type": "clause", "offset": [68, 83]}, {"key": "case-1", "type": "definition", "offset": [85, 91]}, {"key": "network-activities", "type": "definition", "offset": [109, 127]}, {"key": "the-trust", "type": "clause", "offset": [140, 149]}, {"key": "the-response", "type": "clause", "offset": [199, 211]}, {"key": "case-2", "type": "definition", "offset": [386, 392]}, {"key": "case-3", "type": "definition", "offset": [663, 669]}, {"key": "a-and-b", "type": "definition", "offset": [725, 732]}, {"key": "calculate-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [944, 957]}, {"key": "our-scheme", "type": "definition", "offset": [1092, 1102]}], "snippet": "We analyze that some well-known security threats cannot work on our proposed scheme. Case 1. can observe the network activities of B. Since the trust of B believing the received message de- pends on the response of the server S, has to forge VA for passing the veri\ufb01cation of S. By our De\ufb01nition 2, it is hard for A to derive the secret point dA \u2217 dS \u2217 Q by using the points UA and US. Case 2. can observe the network activities of S. Since the trust of S believing the received message de- pends on the veri\ufb01cation of VA and VB, A has to forge VA and VB for passing the veri\ufb01cations. The reason is the same as Case 1. By our De\ufb01nition 2, this way is infeasible. Case 3. wants to forge the responses of S. Since the trust of A and B believing the responses are sent from S depends on the veri\ufb01cation of VSA and VSB. The goal of is to forge VSA and VSB for passing the veri\ufb01cations. By our De\ufb01nition 2, it is computationally infeasible for A to calculate the points rA \u2217 dS \u2217 Q and rB \u2217 dS \u2217 Q. It implies that cannot forge the points (VSA, VSB). The man-in-the-middle attack does not work in our scheme.", "hash": "1729d75aecefa16ebe371de058866e04", "id": 9}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "5M2SR53YzP", "uri": "/contracts/5M2SR53YzP#security-analysis", "label": "Distributed Collaborative Key Agreement and Authentication Protocols", "score": 22.4154682159, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "security-goals", "type": "clause", "offset": [28, 42]}, {"key": "perfect-forward-secrecy", "type": "clause", "offset": [125, 148]}, {"key": "section-v", "type": "clause", "offset": [209, 218]}, {"key": "flow-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [301, 308]}, {"key": "key-messages", "type": "clause", "offset": [317, 329]}, {"key": "the-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [369, 374]}, {"key": "for-e", "type": "clause", "offset": [465, 470]}, {"key": "based-on", "type": "clause", "offset": [627, 635]}], "snippet": "A-TGDH satisfies our stated security goals with the following assumptions. Since key confirmation is essential for achieving perfect forward secrecy [4], we assume that it has been implemented as described in Section V-B. Also, we assume that there exists only a passive adversary E that monitors the flow of blinded key messages. We further assume that E cannot solve the \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587-\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 problem [6] (i.e., given only \u03b1, p, \u03b1x mod p, and \u03b1y mod p, it is infeasible for E to compute \u03b1xy mod p) and the discrete logarithm problem (i.e., given only \u03b1, p, and \u03b1x mod p, it is infeasible for E to compute x). The following proof is based on [3], [14].", "hash": "ab114af72d4bdd08244cb230a4d296f6", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "CloSVGoVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3RzcjYLEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2IhpzZWN1cml0eS1hbmFseXNpcyMwMDAwMDAwYQyiAQJlbhgAIAA=", "clause": {"parents": [["introduction", "Introduction"], ["functioning-of-the-proposed-scheme", "Functioning of the proposed scheme"], ["key-establishment-phase", "Key establishment phase"], ["performance-analysis", "Performance Analysis"], ["latency-first-smart-contract", "LATENCY-FIRST SMART CONTRACT"]], "title": "Security Analysis", "size": 93, "children": [["forward-secrecy", "Forward Secrecy"], ["", ""], ["known-key-security", "Known-key security"], ["formal-security-analysis", "Formal Security Analysis"], ["session-key-security", "Session key security"]], "id": "security-analysis", "related": [["risk-analysis", "Risk Analysis", "Risk Analysis"], ["quantitative-analysis", "Quantitative Analysis", "Quantitative Analysis"], ["sampling-and-analysis", "Sampling and Analysis", "Sampling and Analysis"], ["escrow-analysis", "Escrow Analysis", "Escrow Analysis"], ["security-and-safety", "Security and Safety", "Security and Safety"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-17T06:09:22+00:00"}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}