{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"snippet": "The (SA) generates a master secret key kHN and stores it in HN .", "samples": [{"hash": "7umcItwbZxd", "uri": "/contracts/7umcItwbZxd#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 27.3708700601, "published": true}, {"hash": "5NvobUvPD2b", "uri": "/contracts/5NvobUvPD2b#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 23.1861738535, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "size": 3, "hash": "31482ea4d8899f15a87b468f171fe7e1", "id": 1}, {"snippet": "Same as [7].", "samples": [{"hash": "7umcItwbZxd", "uri": "/contracts/7umcItwbZxd#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 27.3708700601, "published": true}, {"hash": "5NvobUvPD2b", "uri": "/contracts/5NvobUvPD2b#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 23.1861738535, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "size": 2, "hash": "31721807f9f165452261bb0160343e2e", "id": 2}, {"snippet": "In the initialization phase, the system parameters (algorithm suite, security parameters, etc.) are shared with the device of the user and the IoT device. In addition, both also request a private-public key pair and corresponding certificate with the aid of a trusted certificate authority (CA). Typically, for constrained devices, implicit certificates like the Elliptic Curve Qu \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (ECQV) certificates [39] are used. The advantage of ECQV is that the CA is not able to construct the private key itself. We denote the pairs by (du, Qu = duG), (dd, Qd = ddG) for the device of the user and the IoT device respectively, with G the generator of the defined elliptic curve.", "samples": [{"hash": "gMQ2Qp3PdZX", "uri": "/contracts/gMQ2Qp3PdZX#initialization-phase", "label": "Publication Agreement", "score": 33.3170352449, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "system-parameters", "type": "clause", "offset": [33, 50]}, {"key": "security-parameters", "type": "clause", "offset": [69, 88]}, {"key": "the-device", "type": "clause", "offset": [112, 122]}, {"key": "the-user", "type": "clause", "offset": [126, 134]}, {"key": "iot-device", "type": "definition", "offset": [143, 153]}, {"key": "in-addition", "type": "clause", "offset": [155, 166]}, {"key": "key-pair", "type": "definition", "offset": [203, 211]}, {"key": "corresponding-certificate", "type": "definition", "offset": [216, 241]}, {"key": "certificate-authority", "type": "clause", "offset": [268, 289]}, {"key": "to-construct", "type": "clause", "offset": [474, 486]}, {"key": "private-key", "type": "definition", "offset": [491, 502]}, {"key": "the-generator", "type": "clause", "offset": [632, 645]}, {"key": "the-defined", "type": "clause", "offset": [649, 660]}], "size": 1, "hash": "151b475d4e376b814c16d109fed2c13d", "id": 3}, {"snippet": "The system administrator (\ud835\udc46\ud835\udc34) starts the initialization process. \ud835\udc46\ud835\udc34 selects a master key \ud835\udc3e\u210e\ud835\udc5b for Hub node (\ud835\udc3b\ud835\udc41) and stores it securely in the \ud835\udc3b\ud835\udc41\u2019s memory.", "samples": [{"hash": "dtNECDAkmV6", "uri": "/contracts/dtNECDAkmV6#initialization-phase", "label": "Research Article", "score": 33.1844033831, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "system-administrator", "type": "clause", "offset": [4, 24]}, {"key": "master-key", "type": "clause", "offset": [78, 88]}], "size": 1, "hash": "2827c11e69f0d0b5b2652153aec0fc25", "id": 4}, {"snippet": "First, the SA picks {G1, G2, Q, e, p}, where G1 is a cyclic additive group of order p, G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of order p, Q is a generator of G1, and e : G1 \u00d7 G1 \u2192 G2 is a bilinear map. Second, the SA generates a random private key s and computes the corresponding public key Ppub = sQ. Finally, the SA publishes parameters {p, G1, G2, Q, e, Ppub, h(.), Ek, Dk} and stores s in the memory of each KDC in a secure environment, where h(.) is the hash function used by this protocol, Ek is the symmetric encryption algorithm, and Dk is the symmetric decryption algorithm.", "samples": [{"hash": "8taUqcrPSWI", "uri": "/contracts/8taUqcrPSWI#initialization-phase", "label": "Blockchain Based Authentication and Dynamic Group Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 31.6510972543, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "private-key", "type": "definition", "offset": [233, 244]}, {"key": "public-key", "type": "definition", "offset": [278, 288]}, {"key": "secure-environment", "type": "definition", "offset": [419, 437]}], "size": 1, "hash": "10e4227a55ac931c9f1c7d26a20e335f", "id": 5}, {"snippet": "Assume the group G has n real group members M1, M2,... , Mn initially. We describe how to distribute the function of the trusted authority to appropriate subgroups (trust set ) so that any k member nodes in an appropriate subgroup can offer the corresponding valid certificate. Here \u201cvalid\u201d means the certificate has been signed with the system secret key SK. Distributing the system secret key shares SKi. Our design uses Shamir\u2019s (k, n)-threshold scheme [16]. First, the TA randomly selects a (k \u2212 1)- degree polynomial f (x) = SK + a1 x + + ak\u22121 xk\u22121, such that the shared secret is f (0) = SK. Each group member obtains a secret share SSMi = (f (Mi) mod m). For any k group members {M1, M2,... , Mk}, La- where\ni=1 grange interpolation yields SK \u2261 \u03a3k (SSM \u00b7 lM (0)) \u2261 \u03a3k SKi (mod m), lMi (0) are the Lagrange coefficients . Obtaining valid certificates: The certificate X for any node is served by the node\u2019s trust set, with each member in that trust set providing a partial certificate XSKi . With any k partial certificates, the requesting member can compute the valid certificate as XSK1 \u00b7 XSK2 \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 XSKk = X(\u03a3k SKi) = XSK [11]. Thus, these k members can work like a trusted authority, and jointly offer the certificate. (We use the t-bounded coalition offsetting algorithm proposed in [11] to ensure that the above equation is valid.) This approach has the nice feature that the system secret key SK is never revealed to any member node nor to any subset of member nodes. They can jointly reconstruct XSK, but never SK itself. While this method can be unsafe if group members can be compromised [13], this difficulty does not arise in our case, as explained in Section 3. Further, AFTD improves fault-tolerance, since Shamir\u2019s threshold scheme ensures that any set of k 1 or less secret shares cannot jointly obtain SK. Thus if any set of k 1 or less secret shares have been discovered, the system secret key SK is still safe from adversaries. Defining Trust Sets. At the beginning, each group member is assigned a unique member ID and associated with a leaf node of the key tree in ascending order. To define trust sets, the group is first split into k-member clusters. The members in the last cluster may have more than k group members when n is not a multiple of k. The upper part of Figure 3 shows a 7-member group. When k = 2, the group is divided into 3 clusters, and the last one has three members.", "samples": [{"hash": "gZOELLyw0wi", "uri": "/contracts/gZOELLyw0wi#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 19.0, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "group-g", "type": "definition", "offset": [11, 18]}, {"key": "group-members", "type": "clause", "offset": [30, 43]}, {"key": "the-function", "type": "clause", "offset": [101, 113]}, {"key": "to-appropriate", "type": "clause", "offset": [139, 153]}, {"key": "an-appropriate", "type": "clause", "offset": [207, 221]}, {"key": "valid-certificate", "type": "definition", "offset": [259, 276]}, {"key": "the-certificate", "type": "clause", "offset": [297, 312]}, {"key": "the-system", "type": "definition", "offset": [334, 344]}, {"key": "key-shares", "type": "definition", "offset": [391, 401]}, {"key": "shared-secret", "type": "definition", "offset": [569, 582]}, {"key": "served-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [892, 901]}, {"key": "each-member", "type": "definition", "offset": [929, 940]}, {"key": "requesting-member", "type": "definition", "offset": [1035, 1052]}, {"key": "the-t", "type": "clause", "offset": [1235, 1240]}, {"key": "to-ensure", "type": "clause", "offset": [1297, 1306]}, {"key": "in-section-3", "type": "clause", "offset": [1665, 1677]}, {"key": "at-the-beginning", "type": "clause", "offset": [1972, 1988]}, {"key": "associated-with", "type": "definition", "offset": [2043, 2058]}, {"key": "the-members", "type": "clause", "offset": [2178, 2189]}, {"key": "a-multiple", "type": "clause", "offset": [2259, 2269]}, {"key": "figure-3", "type": "definition", "offset": [2294, 2302]}, {"key": "member-group", "type": "definition", "offset": [2313, 2325]}], "size": 1, "hash": "977f751b0a9b3d5a068c30b9da46f222", "id": 6}, {"snippet": "In this phase, the server S chooses (x, Tk(x)), k as its pub- lic key and secret key, and chooses a secure one-way hash function h(\u00b7); the ith user Ui chooses his/her identity IDi, password PWi and biometrics image sample Bi, respec- tively. Additionally, Ui and S choose a symmetric parametric function d( ) and a predetermined threshold \u03c4 for biomet- rics certification. In each feature extraction, each different azimuth or origin of force will make the new extracted bio- metrics and the stored biometrics to have different degree of difference. d( ) is used to compute deviation degree between the results of feature extraction and the stored samples. The meaning of \u03c4 is the biggest deviation degree can be accepted.", "samples": [{"hash": "b7Wgb8G8h6H", "uri": "/contracts/b7Wgb8G8h6H#initialization-phase", "label": "Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 22.4802098955, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "feature-extraction", "type": "clause", "offset": [381, 399]}, {"key": "origin-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [427, 436]}, {"key": "meaning-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [661, 671]}], "size": 1, "hash": "cce2cb0320bee679de51a3322feeec35", "id": 7}, {"snippet": "Initially, the manager of storage server should select three proper parameters, namely g , p and h(\u22c5) , to ensure the DLP secure enough. This could be done by executing the \u201cdhparam\u201d command provided by openssl. Then, a long secret key should be selected and kept secretly for the storage server. Once all the parameters are selected, they are fixed and couldn\u2019t be changed any more. And for safety reasons, it is recommended to split the secret key to multi-parts that are kept by different individuals respectively. When all the parameters are ready, the server manager starts the storage server to provide service for the end users.", "samples": [{"hash": "5jfzWNofjeJ", "uri": "/contracts/5jfzWNofjeJ#initialization-phase", "label": "Mutual Password Authentication Scheme", "score": 22.1375770021, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-manager", "type": "definition", "offset": [11, 22]}, {"key": "to-ensure", "type": "clause", "offset": [104, 113]}, {"key": "a-long", "type": "clause", "offset": [218, 224]}, {"key": "safety-reasons", "type": "definition", "offset": [392, 406]}, {"key": "kept-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [474, 481]}, {"key": "to-provide", "type": "definition", "offset": [598, 608]}, {"key": "end-users", "type": "definition", "offset": [625, 634]}], "size": 1, "hash": "f46e11152959f35ebb47563006b47a77", "id": 8}, {"snippet": "(1) \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 share their keys through QKD, k A = {k A1 , k A2 ,..., k Ai ,..., k A2n } , k Ai = {00,01,10,11} and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and Bob share their keys through QKD, k B = {k B1 , k B2 ,..., k Bi ,..., k B2n } , k Bi = {00,01,10,11} .\n(2) \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 prepares quantum sequences randomly as SA = {A1 , A 2 ,..., Ai ,..., A n } and SB = {B1 , B2 ,..., Bi ,..., Bn } , A i , Bi \u2208 { 0 , 1 , + , - } .\n(3) \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 performs corresponding unitary operations on S A according to k A (Tab. 1 for specific operation rules). The four unitary operations are expressed as Eqs. (1)-(4): U00 = \u0399 = 0 0 + 1 1 (1) U01 = \u0396 = 0 0 \u2212 1 1 (2) U10 = \u03a7 = 1 0 + 0 1 (3) U11 = \u03a5 = 1 0 \u2212 0 1 (4) A The sequence after the pass-through operation is recorded as S' . In order to detect the S S A A eavesdropping, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 inserts a decoy photon sequence into the sequence ' and declines the state of particles in a photon sequence randomly from { 0 , 1 , + , - } , sending ' A to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587. When \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 receives the sequence S' , she informs \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 that she has received the", "samples": [{"hash": "5q5QHXu3HVi", "uri": "/contracts/5q5QHXu3HVi#initialization-phase", "label": "Quantum Electronic Contract", "score": 29.6291983137, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "according-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [457, 469]}, {"key": "operation-rules", "type": "definition", "offset": [495, 510]}, {"key": "in-order-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [736, 747]}, {"key": "s-s", "type": "clause", "offset": [759, 762]}, {"key": "state-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [859, 867]}, {"key": "when-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [955, 961]}], "size": 1, "hash": "2e10c33e54bf6671b1ecf183336d5d82", "id": 9}, {"snippet": "This phase is unchanged from [21].", "samples": [{"hash": "fYJRVbjpEAP", "uri": "/contracts/fYJRVbjpEAP#initialization-phase", "label": "Key Agreement Protocols", "score": 27.0351895488, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "phase-is", "type": "definition", "offset": [5, 13]}], "size": 1, "hash": "b451a294cbb27ecfcd6e052c3a6af8ba", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "Cl0SV2oVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3RzcjkLEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2Ih1pbml0aWFsaXphdGlvbi1waGFzZSMwMDAwMDAwYQyiAQJlbhgAIAA=", "clause": {"parents": [["our-proposed-scheme", "Our Proposed Scheme"], ["proposed-protocol", "Proposed Protocol"], ["the-key-agreement-protocol", "The Key Agreement Protocol"], ["construction", "Construction"], ["biometrics-certification", "Biometrics certification"]], "title": "Initialization Phase", "children": [["", ""], ["trust-set", "Trust Set)"]], "size": 13, "id": "initialization-phase", "related": [["development-phase", "Development Phase", "Development Phase"], ["production-phase", "Production Phase", "Production Phase"], ["design-development-phase", "Design Development Phase", "Design Development Phase"], ["construction-phase", "Construction Phase", "Construction Phase"], ["construction-phase-fee", "Construction Phase Fee", "Construction Phase Fee"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-07T12:37:54+00:00", "also_ask": [], "drafting_tip": null, "explanation": "The Initialization Phase clause defines the initial period or set of activities that must occur at the start of a project or contractual relationship. Typically, this clause outlines specific tasks, deliverables, or milestones that need to be completed before the main obligations of the contract commence, such as setting up systems, onboarding personnel, or conducting preliminary assessments. By clearly delineating these early requirements, the clause ensures that both parties are prepared and aligned before substantive work begins, thereby reducing misunderstandings and setting a solid foundation for the rest of the agreement."}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}