Hudson. Compliance The Union shall comply with the requirements set forth in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) for the deduction of agency shop fees. Annually, the Union shall certify in writing to the City that the Union has complied with the requirements set forth in this section and in Hudson, 475U.S. 292. I.F. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Hudson. The adjusted Percentage Interest of Hudson, in the aggregate, is calculated by dividing (1) the positive difference, if any, between (a) the sum of (i) one hundred percent (100%) of the aggregate Capital Contributions (excluding Substituted Capital Contributions) then or theretofore made by Hudson to the Company ($975,000), plus (ii) one hundred and fifty percent (150%) of the Substituted Capital Contributions then or theretofore made by Hudson to the Company ($225,000), minus (b) the Excess Amounts attributable to the Substituted Capital Contributions then or theretofore made by any other Member to the Company on account of Hudson’s failure to make any Additional Capital Contribution ($0), by (2) one hundred percent (100%) of the aggregate Capital Contributions (including without limitation Substituted Capital Contributions) then or theretofore made by all of the Members to the Company ($1,500,000). This results in a Percentage Interest for Hudson of (i) the sum of $975,000 plus $225,000 divided by (ii) $1,500,000 = 80%.
Hudson. The ownership, executive staff and management of Borrower are material factors in Lender's willingness to institute and maintain a lending relationship with Borrower.
Hudson. ’S HOLDING Hudson involved a knock-and-announce violation that occurred during the execution of a search warrant. See 547U.S. at 588. That fact does not mean, however, that Hudson’s holding is limited to the search-warrant context: Every case is “limited to its facts,” if by that phrase one means that the court based its judgment on the facts presented to it. But most cases are also decided with reference to some more general normative principle which extends beyond the specific circumstances of the case before the court. Indeed, it is the existence of such broader norms which distinguishes a decision which is principled and rational from one which is ad hoc and arbitrary. Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Here, for instance, the Hudson Court framed the issue broadly. See 547 U.S. at 590 (“The issue here is . . . whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement.”); id. at 588 (“We decide whether violation of the ‘knock-and-announce’ rule requires the suppression of all evidence found in the search.”). These statements are not “pluck[ed]” out of context, Maj. Op. 12; they are the two instances in which the Hudson Court framed the question presented.8 And nowhere in the opinion
Hudson the Supreme Court considered whether exclusion was warranted when law enforcement officers violated the knock-and-announce rule while executing a search warrant. 547 U.S. at 588. Two factors governed its consideration: whether there was a causal link between the violation and the seizure of evidence and whether the rule’s deterrence benefits outweighed the costs of excluding probative evidence. As to causation, the Hudson Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule is only triggered when the constitutional violation is “a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence,” provided that causal connection is not “too attenuated.” Id. at592. In Hudson, “the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.” Id. That is because the knock-and-announce violation did not expand the breadth of the search authority conferred on the officers by the search warrant they had in hand, pursuant to which they already were privileged to obtain the incriminating evidence. Id. Even if the knock-and-announce violation had been a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence, causation in Hudson was too attenuated. Id. at 592-93. Attenuation occurs “when the causal connection is remote.” Id. at 593. Attenuation also occurs, the Court explained, when “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Id. Having held there was no but-for causation, the Court did not analyze whether causation was too remote. It did hold, however, that even if there were but-for causation, the interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule nonetheless would not, in the search warrant context, beserved by suppression of the evidence obtained. Id. at 593-94. In that context, the Hudson Court observed, the knock- and-announce rule protects personal safety, property, and a residuum of privacy not obviated by the search warrant. It protects personal safety by preventing violence by a surprised resident. Id. at 594. It avoids destruction of the doorway of a house when officers forcibly open it instead of using the requisite knock and announcement of identity and purpose to summon the homeowner to the door. Id. And it “protects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance” by giving residents an opportunity “to pull on clothes[,] get out of bed,” and otherwise “collect [themselves] before answering the door.” Id. (internal quotation marks o...