Exclusion of Evidence Sample Clauses

Exclusion of Evidence. Skannell argues that the district court erred when it excluded specific evidence and testimony from being used to attack Holmescredibility. Specifically, Skannell refers to a 2004 Omaha World-Herald article, which the district court prevented the defense from introducing into evidence or discussing during the trial. "'We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.'" Katz, 445 F.3d at 1031-32 (quoting Urbina, 431 F.3d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 2005)). The article in question referred to a state homicide trial in which Holmes was a witness and was cooperating with the state. (Appellant Skannell's Add. at 9.) The article quoted police investigators, who stated that Holmes had provided information about a homicide to the state, hoping to have his federal sentence reduced. (Id.) Skannell's intent was to use the article to attack Holmes’ credibility and to show that he "lied about the reason for his cooperation . . . and that he's also testifying in order to get a shorter jail sentence." (Trial Tr. at 1019.) The jury was already well aware of the fact that Holmes was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement and with the hope of receiving a sentence reduction because of his cooperation. The article involved a separate state homicide case that did not pertain to the case at hand and would not have provided new information regarding Holmes’ motivation for testifying. The district court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the Government's objection to the admission of the article, where the evidence was at most cumulative of other evidence before the jury. See United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir) (affirming exclusion of cumulative evidence), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 764 (2005).
Exclusion of Evidence. Irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.
Exclusion of Evidence. Any reference in any manner by counsel or any witness that suggests, by argument or otherwise, that a party sought to exclude from evidence or proof any matters bearing on the issues in this cause or the rights of the parties to this suit. FED. R. EVID. 401-403.
Exclusion of Evidence. In her first issue, Basora contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her trial evidence as a discovery sanction based on her failure to sufficiently answer interrogatories propounded by Swanson. Specifically, Basora argues that she offered exhibits and attempted to elicit cross-examination testimony from Swanson at the hearing relating to the cost of health insurance for the children, how much Swanson paid for the children’s health insurance each month, and the college expenses Basora had incurred for their daughters but that the trial court excluded the exhibits and testimony.The penalty under rule 193.6 for a party’s failure to respond to a discovery request is the mandatory exclusion of the evidence requested. See Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. 1992); F & H Invs., Inc. v. State, 55 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.). A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response in a timely manner may not introduce in evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed unless the court finds that (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely disclose or (2) the failure will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other parties. Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Burns, 209 S.W.3d 806, 817(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a)). The trial court has discretion to determine whether the offering party has met its burden, Id. (citing Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914), but any ―finding of good cause or of the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice must be supported by the record.‖ Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.6(b). Moreover, parties have a duty to amend or supplement discovery responses ―reasonably promptly‖ after discovering the need to amend or supplement, and ―it is presumed that an amended or supplemental [discovery] response made less than 30 days before trial was not made reasonably promptly.‖ Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5(b).Here, the trial court excluded Basora’s exhibits and testimony relating to the cost of the children’s health insurance, the amount Swanson paid for the children’s health insurance and the college expenses Basora incurred because Basora did not adequately respond to interrogatories. Concerning health insurance, Swanson’s interrogatory had requested that Basora state the cost of the health insurance that she provided for the children, the amount she requested that Swanson pay, and the amount that Swanson paid each month for th...
Exclusion of Evidence. ¶35 U-Line’s main argument is that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by excluding evidence that did not relate to residual magnetism. ¶36 A trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence and its decision will not be reversed absent an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 140-41, 438 N.W.2d580 (1989); see State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶9, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d485. “[T]he question on appeal is not whether this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence, would have permitted it to come in….” State v. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224, 232, 397 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1986). Rather, we “will uphold a decision to admit or exclude evidence if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion.” Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698. Thus, we will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion if there is a rational basis for the trial court’s decision. State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).
Exclusion of Evidence. ¶15. Decatur contends that the circuit court erroneously excluded testimony about (1) his character for peacefulness and (2) threats made against him prior to the shooting. We review the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Ross v. State, 308 So. 3d 885, 889 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). “We give great deference to the discretion of the trial judge, and unless we conclude that the decision was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s decision will stand.” Griffin v. State, 269 So. 3d 337, 346 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Chaupette v. State, 136 So. 3d 1041, 1045 (¶7) (Miss. 2014)).
Exclusion of Evidence. KRA also challenges the exclusion of evidence it offered. The documents it submitted to try to reconcile its claims with expenditures were not documents “kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,” nor was producing those documents “a regular practice” of KRA. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B), (C). They were therefore properly excluded as inadmissible hearsay.The District Court’s decision to exclude the email authored by PWDC’s President is another matter. The Court dismissed that email as irrelevant, but it is hard to see howthat could be so since it bore directly on how the budget was affected by contractual benchmarks. It was written soon after the end of FY 2009 and discussed how contracts in that year for EARN centers had worked out financially. PWDC’s President’s statement that many of the EARN centers “earned above the contract amount in certain performance benchmarks” and that those payments “‘busted’ the budget” could have given the jury a basis for accepting KRA’s interpretation of the contract. (App. at 2586.) If performance payments had “busted” the budget, then the jury could have concluded that PWDC had not cabined profit to 10% and had instead allowed contractors to keep all of their profits.But even if the District Court should have allowed the e-mail into evidence, the error was harmless. It is highly likely that the admission of the e-mail would not have altered the jury verdict. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that nonconstitutional errors in civil suits “are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case”). While the e-mail could have supported KRA’s interpretation of the contract, it also could be interpreted in harmony with PWDC’s interpretation. Testimony at trial suggested that the budget was “busted” as a result of the mandate that an EARN center accept all “clients that are referred to that EARN Center.” (App. at 512.) In light of the economic downturn, there was greater demand for the services of the EARN Center and therefore PWDC incurred unusually high expenses. (App. at 512.) And, overall, PWDC’s case was strong. Even some of the witnesses called by KRA supported PWDC’s interpretation of the contract. Indeed, KRA’s own internal audit supported PWDC’s position that excess paymentsneeded to be returned to PWDC. (See App. at 2526 (noting that KRA “does not maintain any equity in the contract and any excess of cash recei...
Exclusion of Evidence. In its second issue, Academy claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence from the jury concerning Turnkey’s failure to withhold and pay sales and employment taxes, which formed one basis for Academy’s breach of contract claim. The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995). To obtain reversal of a judgment based upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, the appellant must show: (1) that the trial court did in fact commit error, and (2) that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989). Therefore, the appellant must show the judgment turns on the particular excluded or admitted evidence. See Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 753-54.Academyoffered the testimony of Gary Winkler, Academy’s comptroller, to showthat from 1991 to 1996, Turnkey failed to pay sales taxes to the State in connection with goods and services Turnkey provided to Academy, and employment taxes on its employees. According to Academy, such evidence established: (1) Turnkey’s breach of the San Antonio and League City contracts, (2) Academy’s defense to Turnkey’s breach of contract claim, and (3) Academy’s claims against Turnkey. The trial court “admit[ed] all of the testimony regarding the sales tax audits before the Court to determine whether or not there are any fact issues to go to the jury on this issue or whether it’s a matter of law.” After hearing the testimony, the trial court determined there were no fact issues concerning the tax matters, but instead, such matters were questions of law for the court.Academy claims that under the San Antonio and League City contracts, it was entitled to withhold all sums due on those contracts until Turnkey had paid all taxes related to the work it performed under the contracts:10. Taxes. The Contract Amount includes all federal, state and local taxes and duties. All taxes levied or assessed against Owner or Contractor arising out of the furnishing or installation by Contractor or materials, equipment or any other kind of personal property in the improvement of the Property shall be paid by Contractor, and all such taxes are included in the Contract Amount. If the applicable taxing authority does not require Contractor to pay all or part such taxes, or Contractor obtains...
Exclusion of Evidence. The Plaintiffs initially sought to have two experts testify at trial on their behalf: Paul LaGrange and James Salvant. Both experts were to testify about the damages to the Plaintiffs’ home and offer opinions on the costs of repair. At a pretrial conference, however, the district court instructed the Plaintiffs that only one of the two experts could testify. The Plaintiffs objected but chose LaGrange. At trial, the Plaintiffs attempted to call Salvant as an expert witness but the district court denied their request. It stated that the Plaintiffs “[did not] have a right to call two experts for the same thing.” The Plaintiffs then submitted Salvant’s deposition testimony as a proffer. The Plaintiffs also sought to admit a report Salvant had prepared regarding wind damage to the Plaintiffs’ home, but Allstate objected to the admission of the report as hearsay. The district court sustained the objection.On appeal, the Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred by excluding Salvant’s testimony and report. We review the district court’s determination of the admissibility of expert evidence for abuse of discretion. Nunez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2010). A district court’s exclusion of an expert is an abuse of discretion when its determination is based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence or an erroneous view of the law. Id. We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusion that Salvant’s report was hearsay.
Exclusion of Evidence. We need not dwell on Garcia's second point. Section 437c, subdivision (b)(2) requires opposition papers to be filed and served 14 days before the hearing, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause. "A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the California Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission." (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765 (Bozzi).) Garcia filed his first set of opposition papers almost a week late. His second set of opposition papers was even later, filed the same day as the summary judgment hearing. Garcia did not show good cause permitting him to file either set of late papers—as noted, nothing in the deposition transcripts cited as a reason for delay helped Garcia's case. The court reasonably excluded the documents filed on April 4 as "more than late under any standards." (G.E. Hetrick & Associates, Inc. v. Summit Construction & Maintenance Co. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 318, 325 [no error in excluding declaration filed the day of the summary judgment hearing]; Bozzi, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 765 [same].) Garcia's failure to file a separate statement with his original opposition papers is consequential. Failure to file a separate statement in opposition to a summary judgment motion "may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court's discretion, for granting the motion." (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3); Oldcastle Prescast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 568.) The trial court exercised its discretion along these lines, partly basing its decision on Garcia's failure to timely file a separate statement. Because there was no abuse of discretion in excluding Garcia's April 4 filing, our review on appeal is limited to whether defendants' moving papers alone show the lack of a triable issue.