{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"snippet": "The Court of Appeals then continued its analysis: Our starting point is that the MSA [Master Services Agreement] is a lease and a contract for services. We have only applied the economic-loss doctrine to contracts for goods, and we have specifically declined to apply the doctrine to service contracts. See \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 v \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 209 Mich App 266; 530 NW2d 171 (1995) (reversing summary disposition on basis that the economic-loss doctrine was wrongly applied to a contract for services); Quest Diagnostics, Inc, 254 Mich App at 379 (\u201cThis Court has declined to apply the economic[- ]loss doctrine where the claim emanates from a contract for services.\u201d). Because the MSA was a services contract, the economic-loss doctrine does not apply. See \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 439 Mich at 527-528. The arbitrator reached the correct conclusion (that the economic-loss doctrine does not apply), even if it did so for the wrong reason (that the parties could not have contemplated the conversion at the time of the MSA's execution). His refusal to apply the economic-loss doctrine\u2014albeit for the wrong reason\u2014was not in contravention of controlling law. The doctrine has only been applied to the sale of goods, and never to a contract for services. Accordingly, this Court agrees with Precision that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to the service agreement between Precision and ADP; therefore, the economic loss doctrine does not bar Precision\u2019s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. This, however, does not end this Court\u2019s analysis. The Court must conduct a \u201cseparate-and distinct analysis.\u201d In Bathtub, the Court of Appeals found that the conversion claim was nevertheless barred because it did not impose duties separate and distinct from the duties existing under the contract. Bathtub, supra citing \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587'\u2587 Constr Corp v Mich Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, (1997). In doing so, the Bathtub Court detailed the law relating to the separate-and-distinct analysis set forth in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 v \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 347 Mich 550 (1956), that was followed up by the Michigan Supreme Court in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587'\u2587 Constr Corp v Mich Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, 83-85 (1997). The Bathtub Court explained: In \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 v \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 347 Mich at 559, our Supreme Court first addressed whether a plaintiff could maintain an action in tort arising out of a breach of contract. There, an orchard worker (the promisor) agreed to care for an orchard under an oral contract, but failed to perform certain care and maintenance that would otherwise amount to negligence. Id. at 560. The orchard owner (the promisee) sued alleging negligence, rather than breach of contract. Id. Addressing the divide between contract actions and tort actions, the Court relied on the dichotomy between misfeasance (action) and nonfeasance (inaction), to describe the distinction: If a party undertakes to perform work, and proceeds on the employment, he makes himself liable for any misfeasance in the course of that work; but if he undertakes, and does not proceed on the work, no [tort] action will lie against him for the nonfeasance. [Id. at 562 (quotation marks and citation omitted; quotation cleaned up).] In other words, when the cause of action arises from a breach of a promise, it is an action in contract; when the action arises from a defendant's negligence or active misconduct (i.e., more than breach of a promise), the action is in tort. See id. at 562-563. Ultimately, the Court held that the orchard worker merely violated his promise to complete his contracted-for performance, so a tort action would not lie. Id. at 565-566. The Bathtub Court then discussed Michigan Supreme Court case of \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2019\u2587 Constr Corp v Mich Bell Tel Co case, which clarified the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction for determining whether an action sounds in tort or in contract. There [in Rinaldo], a construction company (and telephone service user) sued its telephone service provider alleging negligence related to a variety of problems with its telephone service. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587'\u2587 Constr, 454 Mich at 67-69. When considering the viability of the negligence claim, the Court indicated that the threshold question is \u201cwhether the plaintiff alleges violation of a legal duty separate and distinct from the contractual obligation.\u201d Id. at 84. It relied on common-law principles that \u201c\u2018[m]isfeasance or negligent affirmative conduct in the performance of a promise generally subjects an actor to tort liability as well as contract liability for physical harm to persons and tangible things.\u2019\u201d Id., quoting \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, Torts, \u00a7 92, pp. 656\u2013657 (emphasis omitted). Generally, there is already a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid physical harm, and entering a contract does not change that preexisting duty. Id. (quotation omitted). The Court concluded, however, that duty \u201cdoes not extend to intangible economic losses.\u201d Id. (quotation committed). Rather, for that sort of loss, the parties manifested intent controls the nature and extent of the parties\u2019 obligation. Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, the claim sounds in contract. See id. (noting that the principle dates at least as far back as \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, and more recently was applied in the UCC context under the \u201ceconomic loss doctrine\u201d in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587). Relying on these principles, the Court concluded that the defendant telephone service provider failed to perform under the terms of its promise. Id. at 85. The plaintiff construction company did not allege physical harm nor \u201cviolation of an independent legal duty distinct from the duties arising out of the contractual relationship.\u201d Id. So, there was no cause of action in tort. The Bathtub Court recognized that these principles are tricky when applying them to the facts; that the nature of conversion is such that it could be characterized as misfeasance (actively stealing or converting another's property) or nonfeasance (a failure to satisfy contractual obligations); and that there are no published cases applying the separate-and-distinct analysis. Nevertheless, the Court found: But here, we find it determinative that no relationship between Bathtub and ReBath existed giving rise of a legal duty separate from the MSA. Bathtub's conversion claim arises from \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587's failure to abide by the MSA. Further, defendant's failure to perform a contractual duty cannot give rise to a tort action, unless a separate-and-distinct duty exists separate from the contractual obligations. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Living Trust v \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Retirement Communities, 326 Mich App 366, 395; 928 NW2d 227 (2018). As the Supreme Court noted in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 347 Mich at 563, while misfeasance is required for a tort action to lie, \u201c[t]here must be some breach of duty distinct from breach of contract.\u201d We conclude that there is no duty separate and distinct from the contractual obligation because any alleged duty under the statute\u2014not to convert the [1- 800 telephone] number\u2014is the same as the duty under the contract. More fundamentally, ReBath's ability or opportunity to convert the number to its own use only arose through virtue of the contractual relationship between Bathtub and ReBath. Ultimately, because there is no separate duty distinct from that existing under the contractual obligations and because breach of the duty would not have been possible but for the contractual relationship, we conclude that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in concluding that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587's conversion claim could lie. See \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 347 Mich at 563; \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587'\u2587 Constr, 454 Mich at 83-85. We therefore affirm the circuit court's decision to vacate that portion of the arbitrator's award but on a different basis. Similarly, here the Court finds that no relationship between Precision and ADP existed giving rise to a legal duty separate from the parties\u2019 Agreement. Precision\u2019s claims that ADP failed to timely file Precision\u2019s payroll tax returns; failed to timely pay Precision\u2019s payroll taxes to the government; and failed to disclose that it had not filed or paid the payroll taxes and returns, relate to ADP\u2019s failure to abide by the terms of that Agreement. Because there is no separate duty distinct from that existing under the Agreement\u2019s obligations and because breach of the duty would not have been possible but for the contractual relationship, ADP\u2019s motion is GRANTED. However, Defendant ADP acknowledges that \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint actually relates to a contractual relationship. \u201d15 Therefore, Plaintiff shall have 14 days from the date of this Opinion to Amend its Complaint to allege a breach of contract claim. ADP\u2019s request for sanctions is respectfully denied.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "court-of-appeals", "type": "clause", "offset": [4, 20]}, {"key": "starting-point", "type": "clause", "offset": [54, 68]}, {"key": "the-msa", "type": "definition", "offset": [77, 84]}, {"key": "master-services-agreement", "type": "definition", "offset": [86, 111]}, {"key": "contract-for-services", "type": "definition", "offset": [130, 151]}, {"key": "contracts-for-goods", "type": "clause", "offset": [204, 223]}, {"key": "to-apply", "type": "clause", "offset": [259, 267]}, {"key": "service-contracts", "type": "definition", "offset": [284, 301]}, {"key": "see-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [303, 308]}, {"key": "summary-disposition", "type": "clause", "offset": [377, 396]}, {"key": "quest-diagnostics", "type": "clause", "offset": [487, 504]}, {"key": "this-court", "type": "definition", "offset": [533, 543]}, {"key": "the-claim", "type": "definition", "offset": [602, 611]}, {"key": "services-contract", "type": "clause", "offset": [676, 693]}, {"key": "the-arbitrator", "type": "clause", "offset": [774, 788]}, {"key": "the-conversion", "type": "clause", "offset": [955, 969]}, {"key": "time-of-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [977, 988]}, {"key": "controlling-law", "type": "clause", "offset": [1111, 1126]}, {"key": "sale-of-goods", "type": "clause", "offset": [1170, 1183]}, {"key": "economic-loss", "type": "definition", "offset": [1278, 1291]}, {"key": "agreement-between", "type": "clause", "offset": [1331, 1348]}, {"key": "breach-of-fiduciary-duty", "type": "clause", "offset": [1442, 1466]}, {"key": "separate-and-distinct", "type": "clause", "offset": [1715, 1736]}, {"key": "the-contract", "type": "definition", "offset": [1768, 1780]}, {"key": "the-law", "type": "clause", "offset": [1907, 1914]}, {"key": "relating-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [1915, 1926]}, {"key": "in-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [1972, 1976]}, {"key": "court-in", "type": "clause", "offset": [2056, 2064]}, {"key": "arising-out-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [2285, 2299]}, {"key": "agreed-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [2362, 2371]}, {"key": "care-and-maintenance", "type": "clause", "offset": [2446, 2466]}, {"key": "a-party", "type": "clause", "offset": [2805, 2812]}, {"key": "the-employment", "type": "clause", "offset": [2857, 2871]}, {"key": "in-the-course-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [2917, 2933]}, {"key": "the-work", "type": "definition", "offset": [2991, 2999]}, {"key": "in-contract", "type": "clause", "offset": [3227, 3238]}, {"key": "the-action", "type": "clause", "offset": [3245, 3255]}, {"key": "for-performance", "type": "clause", "offset": [3502, 3517]}, {"key": "tort-action", "type": "definition", "offset": [3524, 3535]}, {"key": "service-user", "type": "clause", "offset": [3857, 3869]}, {"key": "telephone-service-provider", "type": "definition", "offset": [3880, 3906]}, {"key": "related-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [3927, 3937]}, {"key": "negligence-claim", "type": "definition", "offset": [4063, 4079]}, {"key": "legal-duty", "type": "clause", "offset": [4178, 4188]}, {"key": "the-performance", "type": "clause", "offset": [4348, 4363]}, {"key": "tort-liability", "type": "definition", "offset": [4408, 4422]}, {"key": "liability-for", "type": "clause", "offset": [4443, 4456]}, {"key": "physical-harm-to-persons", "type": "definition", "offset": [4457, 4481]}, {"key": "tangible-things", "type": "clause", "offset": [4486, 4501]}, {"key": "duty-to-exercise-reasonable-care", "type": "clause", "offset": [4613, 4645]}, {"key": "nature-and-extent", "type": "clause", "offset": [4948, 4965]}, {"key": "of-the-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [4966, 4980]}, {"key": "terms-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [5358, 5366]}, {"key": "an-independent", "type": "clause", "offset": [5473, 5487]}, {"key": "contractual-relationship", "type": "definition", "offset": [5543, 5567]}, {"key": "no-cause-of-action", "type": "clause", "offset": [5588, 5606]}, {"key": "the-facts", "type": "clause", "offset": [5700, 5709]}, {"key": "nature-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [5720, 5729]}, {"key": "failure-to-satisfy", "type": "clause", "offset": [5866, 5884]}, {"key": "contractual-obligations", "type": "clause", "offset": [5885, 5908]}, {"key": "relationship-between", "type": "clause", "offset": [6068, 6088]}, {"key": "failure-to-perform", "type": "definition", "offset": [6265, 6283]}, {"key": "a-separate", "type": "definition", "offset": [6345, 6355]}, {"key": "living-trust", "type": "definition", "offset": [6430, 6442]}, {"key": "the-supreme-court", "type": "clause", "offset": [6525, 6542]}, {"key": "breach-of-duty", "type": "definition", "offset": [6653, 6667]}, {"key": "no-duty", "type": "clause", "offset": [6729, 6736]}, {"key": "the-statute", "type": "definition", "offset": [6822, 6833]}, {"key": "to-convert", "type": "clause", "offset": [6838, 6848]}, {"key": "that-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [7381, 7387]}, {"key": "circuit-court", "type": "clause", "offset": [7512, 7525]}, {"key": "tax-returns", "type": "clause", "offset": [7835, 7846]}, {"key": "payroll-taxes", "type": "clause", "offset": [7881, 7894]}, {"key": "the-government", "type": "definition", "offset": [7898, 7912]}, {"key": "to-disclose", "type": "definition", "offset": [7925, 7936]}, {"key": "taxes-and-returns", "type": "clause", "offset": [7979, 7996]}, {"key": "relate-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [7998, 8007]}, {"key": "the-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [8131, 8144]}, {"key": "relates-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [8355, 8365]}, {"key": "date-of-this", "type": "clause", "offset": [8447, 8459]}, {"key": "to-amend", "type": "definition", "offset": [8468, 8476]}, {"key": "breach-of-contract-claim", "type": "clause", "offset": [8503, 8527]}, {"key": "request-for", "type": "clause", "offset": [8535, 8546]}], "samples": [{"hash": "lwotjBJNCSP", "uri": "/contracts/lwotjBJNCSP#emphasis-added", "label": "Payroll Agreement", "score": 30.2046106161, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "6f2eea89ea3e65152a668f51dd43484e", "id": 4}, {"snippet": "[89] It is evident that at the time payment was made to LCaribbean GOSL was fully seized of the assignment of the receivables payable from the Project and such these receivables could only have been categorized as a payable to KCL. [90] In First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R the question for the court was whether a factor was entitled to recover monies paid to the Minister of National Revenue from receivables which were purchased prior to the Minister issuing a request for statutory garnishment, in connection with these receivables. The court ruled that monies owing on accounts factored prior to the date of the request for garnishment were not subject to the garnishment, however accounts factored after that date were effectively intercepted by it. In other words once the receivables were factored before the Minister issued a request to garnish, the National Revenue was prevented from asserting an interest in these invoices. Consequently, a declaration was made confirming the factor\u2019s entitlement to the funds already paid to the Minister. [91] On this point I conclude that the funds paid to LCaribbean were indeed the property of KCL, which ought not to have been utilized as if it were the property of AMSL. Therefore GOSL is liable to pay to KCL the remaining sums under the Notices.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "time-payment", "type": "clause", "offset": [31, 43]}, {"key": "the-receivables", "type": "clause", "offset": [110, 125]}, {"key": "the-project", "type": "clause", "offset": [139, 150]}, {"key": "payable-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [216, 226]}, {"key": "the-court", "type": "clause", "offset": [290, 299]}, {"key": "the-minister", "type": "clause", "offset": [360, 372]}, {"key": "prior-to-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [431, 443]}, {"key": "for-statutory", "type": "clause", "offset": [471, 484]}, {"key": "in-connection-with", "type": "clause", "offset": [498, 516]}, {"key": "monies-owing", "type": "clause", "offset": [557, 569]}, {"key": "date-of-the-request", "type": "definition", "offset": [604, 623]}, {"key": "subject-to-the", "type": "definition", "offset": [649, 663]}, {"key": "the-national", "type": "clause", "offset": [854, 866]}, {"key": "an-interest", "type": "clause", "offset": [904, 915]}, {"key": "the-factor", "type": "definition", "offset": [983, 993]}, {"key": "entitlement-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [996, 1010]}, {"key": "the-funds", "type": "clause", "offset": [1011, 1020]}, {"key": "the-property", "type": "clause", "offset": [1127, 1139]}, {"key": "pay-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [1250, 1256]}], "samples": [{"hash": "OhRvXiIxCp", "uri": "/contracts/OhRvXiIxCp#emphasis-added", "label": "Factoring Agreement", "score": 26.7549623546, "published": true}, {"hash": "9qHw4ofRoWr", "uri": "/contracts/9qHw4ofRoWr#emphasis-added", "label": "Factoring Agreement", "score": 26.7549623546, "published": true}], "size": 2, "hash": "0c96e590e76b35d4d8aca8317e85fb15", "id": 2}, {"snippet": "The SME notes that the three aforementioned BSS documents contain helpful information, consistent with the Agreement, to increase BSS workers\u2019 awareness of the shift from residential, and how to access the HCBS to support that redirection. The SME notes one error in the Pathway to Children\u2019s Mental Health document, specific to CMCR in the sub header 3.2 Children\u2019s Crisis and Referral Line and Mobile Mental Health Crisis:", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [103, 116]}, {"key": "how-to-access", "type": "clause", "offset": [188, 201]}, {"key": "the-sub", "type": "clause", "offset": [337, 344]}, {"key": "mental-health-crisis", "type": "definition", "offset": [403, 423]}], "samples": [{"hash": "hlYDvIxavgt", "uri": "/contracts/hlYDvIxavgt#emphasis-added", "label": "Agreement Between the State of West Virginia and the United States Department of Justice", "score": 31.1172612891, "published": true}, {"hash": "zfyoVvOuwV", "uri": "/contracts/zfyoVvOuwV#emphasis-added", "label": "Report", "score": 25.3518138261, "published": true}], "size": 2, "hash": "e15f1fd66cb8116d9a12c839d662c5fe", "id": 1}, {"snippet": "The Court has found that the Brusers violated the CCD by not paying the Trustee Fee as determined by the state court. Under the CCD, therefore, BOH, as Lessor, is entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.10 BOH may also be entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. \u201cThe general rule is that \u2018[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest is governed by 10 Given the 7/21/15 Order and the Stipulation, the instant decision addresses a claim brought only by BOH. To the extent that any other parties to this action believe that they are entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, each must file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54.3 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (\u201cLocal Rules\u201d). federal law.\u2019\u201d \u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587. Adalian, Civil No. 09-00226 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 477268, at *7 n.7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 5, 2015) (alteration in Jou) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court, however, need not address these issues, or the specific amount of attorneys\u2019 fees, until BOH files the appropriate motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3. Likewise, the Court need not address any taxable costs unless and until BOH files the appropriate motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.2.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-court", "type": "clause", "offset": [0, 9]}, {"key": "trustee-fee", "type": "definition", "offset": [72, 83]}, {"key": "state-court", "type": "definition", "offset": [105, 116]}, {"key": "fees-and-costs", "type": "definition", "offset": [186, 200]}, {"key": "prejudgment-and-postjudgment-interest", "type": "clause", "offset": [232, 269]}, {"key": "general-rule", "type": "clause", "offset": [276, 288]}, {"key": "state-law", "type": "clause", "offset": [322, 331]}, {"key": "rate-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [347, 354]}, {"key": "prejudgment-interest", "type": "definition", "offset": [355, 375]}, {"key": "to-the-extent", "type": "clause", "offset": [526, 539]}, {"key": "other-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [549, 562]}, {"key": "this-action", "type": "definition", "offset": [566, 577]}, {"key": "pursuant-to-federal-rule-of-civil-procedure", "type": "clause", "offset": [663, 706]}, {"key": "rules-of-practice", "type": "clause", "offset": [740, 757]}, {"key": "united-states-district-court", "type": "definition", "offset": [765, 793]}, {"key": "for-the-district", "type": "clause", "offset": [794, 810]}, {"key": "federal-law", "type": "definition", "offset": [839, 850]}, {"key": "taxable-costs", "type": "definition", "offset": [1313, 1326]}], "samples": [{"hash": "cwlBrHcrSj7", "uri": "/contracts/cwlBrHcrSj7#emphasis-added", "label": "Trust Agreement", "score": 25.1317033795, "published": true}, {"hash": "bNzwrzg6JLV", "uri": "/contracts/bNzwrzg6JLV#emphasis-added", "label": "Trust Agreement", "score": 22.0663928816, "published": true}], "size": 2, "hash": "535bd8348d470d97d6e023c1dc1f7544", "id": 3}, {"snippet": "95 Ibid., 15. An additional philosophical conundrum arises from \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2019\u2587 distinction between truth and effectiveness. Even as \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 himself is considered one of the twelve \u201cmost effective\u201d preachers in the English-speaking world, he insists that he has no concern for listener response. He writes, \u201cNext Sunday, if once again my congregation appears to be unmoved and unimpressed by my homiletical efforts, I intend to ascribe their lack of response to God! Our job as preachers is to stand up and speak the truth as God gives it to us; congregational response is God\u2019s business.\u201d96 Such a statement, even if hyperbolic, proceeds upon the a priori decision to separate truth from effectiveness. Might not an ineffective sermon point just as clearly to truth as falsehood? Compare \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 preaching during the 1st Great Awakening with the \u201cWord of Faith\u201d prosperity preaching; both are effective by their own standards. Rather than drawing proclamation closer to theology (the Word of God preached is the Word of God), binary commitments unintentionally enforce the very same anthropology that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 wishes to overcome. He writes, \u201cWe preachers are to worry more about what is being said and how well we can replicate that word than we are to worry about whether or not what is being said in the Gospel is being heard in the world.\u201d97 Whatever the cause of our worry, is not such an effort a human effort? Would it not be more theological to bear witness to God\u2019s Word in the biblical text and in the world, to preach God\u2019s Word and trust God to communicate the truth to be found therein as well as any human response? Neither truth nor effectiveness ought to guide preaching because neither is within the confines of human agency.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "an-additional", "type": "clause", "offset": [14, 27]}, {"key": "no-concern", "type": "clause", "offset": [258, 268]}, {"key": "lack-of-response", "type": "clause", "offset": [438, 454]}, {"key": "the-truth", "type": "definition", "offset": [509, 518]}, {"key": "a-priori", "type": "definition", "offset": [644, 652]}, {"key": "the-word", "type": "definition", "offset": [985, 993]}, {"key": "that-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [1101, 1107]}, {"key": "the-world", "type": "definition", "offset": [1336, 1345]}, {"key": "witness-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [1462, 1472]}, {"key": "human-response", "type": "definition", "offset": [1618, 1632]}], "samples": [{"hash": "jLSu8qf3odn", "uri": "/contracts/jLSu8qf3odn#emphasis-added", "label": "Distribution Agreement", "score": 25.2757681602, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "cebcf879d3b955fb63bb6ca17c46c5d7", "id": 5}, {"snippet": "That demand is acceded to by point 3 of Section C. The period allowed for the transmission of reasoned opinions is increased, in this instance, from the eight weeks provided for by Article 6 of Protocol (No 2) to 12 weeks. Under the procedure, where reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent more than 55 per cent of the votes allocated to national Parliaments,6 the item will be included on the Council agenda for a comprehensive discussion; following which \u201cthe representatives of the Member States acting in their capacity as members of the Council will discontinue their consideration of the draft legislative act in question unless the draft is amended to accommodate the concerns expressed in the reasoned opinions\u201d. The implementation technique, therefore, entails a Council conduct agreement: the members of the Council would, in the prescribed circumstances, discontinue discussion of the proposal and refrain from voting on it. The envisaged obligation appears to me to be fully compatible with EU law, and hence legally binding, since there is nothing in the Treaties that requires the Council to proceed to the adoption of a given proposal, supposing that the requisite majority is available. In my opinion, it is arguable that once the HSG Decision is in force, the adoption of a legislative measure in defiance of the red card procedure will constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, and hence grounds for the annulment of the measure under Article 263 TFEU.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-period", "type": "clause", "offset": [51, 61]}, {"key": "the-transmission", "type": "clause", "offset": [74, 90]}, {"key": "article-6", "type": "definition", "offset": [181, 190]}, {"key": "the-procedure", "type": "definition", "offset": [229, 242]}, {"key": "the-non", "type": "clause", "offset": [271, 278]}, {"key": "legislative-act", "type": "clause", "offset": [301, 316]}, {"key": "per-cent", "type": "definition", "offset": [375, 383]}, {"key": "allocated-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [397, 409]}, {"key": "the-council-agenda", "type": "clause", "offset": [462, 480]}, {"key": "the-member-states", "type": "clause", "offset": [553, 570]}, {"key": "the-council-will", "type": "clause", "offset": [610, 626]}, {"key": "conduct-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [852, 869]}, {"key": "the-members", "type": "clause", "offset": [871, 882]}, {"key": "prescribed-circumstances", "type": "clause", "offset": [912, 936]}, {"key": "the-proposal", "type": "clause", "offset": [964, 976]}, {"key": "eu-law", "type": "clause", "offset": [1075, 1081]}, {"key": "legally-binding", "type": "definition", "offset": [1093, 1108]}, {"key": "requisite-majority", "type": "definition", "offset": [1242, 1260]}, {"key": "in-force", "type": "definition", "offset": [1335, 1343]}, {"key": "red-card", "type": "definition", "offset": [1402, 1410]}, {"key": "infringement-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [1440, 1455]}, {"key": "procedural-requirement", "type": "clause", "offset": [1469, 1491]}, {"key": "under-article", "type": "definition", "offset": [1544, 1557]}], "samples": [{"hash": "eOxOjZE2iQL", "uri": "/contracts/eOxOjZE2iQL#emphasis-added", "label": "Agreement on the Reform of the Eu", "score": 25.0456219877, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "fc9c3b0dda795eae84639832ec0d7626", "id": 6}, {"snippet": "The contract documents affirmatively indicate that shore protection structures consisting of rubble and riprap would be present near the Oxy-Chemical Dock. By employing the very dredging practice that the Specifications advised against\u2014\u201c[e]xcessive[ly] cutting outside the side slope lines and grades,\u201d JX 2 (Specs) at 118, \u00b6 3.5.2\u2014plaintiff did not act as a reasonably prudent contractor. Further, when preparing the bid estimate for the Upper Bayou Project, \u2587\u2587. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 anticipated that the Millennium would encounter \u201crock, . . . ri[p]ra[p] from shore protection projects,\u201d and other \u201ccommon types\u201d of obstructions. JX 98A (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Dep.), at 222:22\u201324. Thus, the conditions encountered by the dredge at the Oxy-Chemical Dock, were not reasonably unforeseeable. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish that the conditions at the Oxy-Chemical Dock constitute a differing site condition.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-contract-documents", "type": "definition", "offset": [0, 22]}, {"key": "the-specifications", "type": "definition", "offset": [201, 219]}, {"key": "side-slope", "type": "definition", "offset": [273, 283]}, {"key": "lines-and-grades", "type": "clause", "offset": [284, 300]}, {"key": "the-bid", "type": "definition", "offset": [414, 421]}, {"key": "the-conditions", "type": "clause", "offset": [660, 674]}, {"key": "to-establish", "type": "clause", "offset": [796, 808]}, {"key": "differing-site-condition", "type": "definition", "offset": [867, 891]}], "samples": [{"hash": "gpdyOQjYftY", "uri": "/contracts/gpdyOQjYftY#emphasis-added", "label": "Contract for Hydraulic Dredging and Hydraulic and Mechanical Levee Construction", "score": 26.1704312115, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "d7d1eca60a223e163b79893544c73035", "id": 7}, {"snippet": "Except as expressly provided herein, the Shareholder Agreement shall continue in full force and effect.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "except-as-expressly-provided", "type": "clause", "offset": [0, 28]}, {"key": "shareholder-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [41, 62]}, {"key": "full-force-and-effect", "type": "definition", "offset": [81, 102]}], "samples": [{"hash": "tFh3Mxrc55", "uri": "/contracts/tFh3Mxrc55#emphasis-added", "label": "Shareholder Agreement (Orion Capital Corp)", "score": 16.0, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "6c5638c788f5a0b7db063dbfe294daf6", "id": 8}, {"snippet": "In conjunction with the language on page 1, language on page 4 reads:", "snippet_links": [{"key": "page-1", "type": "definition", "offset": [36, 42]}, {"key": "page-4", "type": "clause", "offset": [56, 62]}], "samples": [{"hash": "2kk5l7UU77L", "uri": "/contracts/2kk5l7UU77L#emphasis-added", "label": "Preneed Contract", "score": 24.2531632541, "published": true}], "size": 1, "hash": "7848f3fbdb61193d299704c345584297", "id": 9}, {"snippet": "Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the effect of rejection is defined by reference to the breach status. As explained in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 244 (1989), [T]he trustee inherits from the pre-bankruptcy debtor a contract created by nonbankruptcy law. The statutory option to \"assume or reject\" means exactly what the Code says it means: the option to perform or breach the contract, the same option every contract party has under nonbankruptcy law. It follows that the trustee is prima facie in the same position as any nonbankruptcy contract party, except when specific bankruptcy principles and rules require a different result. Thus, a breach of contract does not automatically result in the contract's termination.6 Instead, the contract remains 6 The trustee contends that under Sea Harvest v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1o77, 1o8o (9th Cir. 1989), the effect of re\u00a1ection is always termination. In Sea Harvest, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the re\u00a1ection of a lease of nonresidential real property under \u00a7 365 was the same as termination of the lease. In support of its ruling, the Sea Harvest court noted that \u00a7 365(d)(4) required that upon re\u00a1ection, the trustee immediately surrender the leased premises. The court stated that \"surrender of property ... has the effect of terminating the enterprise that operates there.\" There is no analogous surrender provision in \u00a7 365 regarding contracts, and Sea Harvest is distinguishable on that basis. I believe Sea Harvest should be narrowly construed. A broad reading would be inconsistent with the express language of the Code defining the effect of re\u00a1ection as a breach, as well as state law defining the consequences of a breach. The trustee argues that the final clause of \u00a7 365(d) is not intended to treat leases differently from contracts, but merely makes explicit that termination of a lease requires surrender of the premises. He reasons that three subsections of \u00a7 365 [(h), (i) and (n)] give the non-debtor party certain options which are inconsistent with termination, and therefore concludes that in all other cases the effect of re\u00a1ection is termination. I disagree regarding the inference that should be drawn from the inclusion of those subsections. I believe that the subsections referred to by the trustee are intended as exceptions to the rule that state law defines the effect of a breach. The exceptions are intended to assure that the non-breaching party retains certain rights in the event of re\u00a1ection regardless of state law rights upon breach. Thus, the provisions are intended to supplement state law rights upon breach under the specific scenarios covered by the subsections, rather than to suggest that in all cases the effect of breach is termination. in existence and the breach gives rise to alternative remedies determined under state law with reference to the breach. See Sachs v. Precision Products Co., 257 Or. 273, 476 P.2d 199, 203 (1970). While the contract remains in existence, the trustee is under no obligation to perform the contract as one of his duties in administering the case. In most cases, since the trustee cannot be compelled to perform under a rejected contract, the non-debtor party chooses to treat the contract as terminated and assert the right to monetary damages as a general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case. In the instant case, because of the breach status, the debtor (and therefore the trustee or his assignee) could not compel the Partnerships to recognize the debtor as having enforceable rights to manage under the Partnership Agreements.7 (...continued) That interpretation is consistent with the Code's general policy of deferring to state law in determining property and contract rights. See \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, supra. at 237 (\"[T]he 'material breach' language focuses the courts' attention on questions of state law. It is there, in state contract and remedies law, that the hard issues of bankruptcy contracts usually are found.\") Under the trustee's reading, the subsections at issue suggest a Congressional intent to override state law in all cases and treat a breach as a per se termination of a contract or lease. Under the interpretation which I adopt, the subsections at issue are intended as limited exceptions to the general rule that state law determines the consequences of a breach. If Congress intended re\u00a1ection of all executory contracts and leases to be the functional equivalent of termination, then it would have so specified. 7 This ruling only concerns the transfer of management rights which may have been property of the estate. 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["identification-of-goods", "Identification of Goods", "Identification of Goods"], ["signaling-protocol", "Signaling protocol", "Signaling protocol"], ["unbundled-channelization-multiplexing", "Unbundled Channelization (Multiplexing)", "Unbundled Channelization (Multiplexing)"], ["description-of-goods", "Description of Goods", "Description of Goods"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-07T12:37:39+00:00", "also_ask": ["How can 'emphasis added' be strategically used to clarify intent in contract interpretation?", "What drafting standards ensure 'emphasis added' is unambiguous and effective?", "What are the risks if 'emphasis added' is misapplied or omitted in key provisions?", "How do courts treat 'emphasis added' in disputes over contractual meaning?", "Are there jurisdictional differences in the legal weight given to 'emphasis added'?"], "drafting_tip": "Specify the method for indicating emphasis to prevent misinterpretation; clarify whether emphasis affects interpretation to ensure consistent application; reference original sources when adding emphasis to maintain transparency.", "explanation": "The 'Emphasis added' clause indicates that any highlighting, bolding, underlining, or other forms of emphasis within quoted material has been inserted by the party presenting the document, rather than appearing in the original source. For example, if a contract excerpt is reproduced in a legal brief and certain words are bolded or italicized, the 'Emphasis added' note clarifies that these modifications were made to draw attention to specific language. This clause ensures transparency and prevents misunderstandings about what was originally emphasized in the source material, thereby maintaining the integrity of quoted content."}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}