{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"samples": [{"hash": "9MqwUrVh8uP", "uri": "/contracts/9MqwUrVh8uP#correctness", "label": "Byzantine Agreement With Homonyms", "score": 26.0732383728, "published": true}, {"hash": "ghPjMfvz1Hp", "uri": "/contracts/ghPjMfvz1Hp#correctness", "label": "Byzantine Agreement With Homonyms", "score": 26.032169342, "published": true}, {"hash": "jyFoCxjvvUb", "uri": "/contracts/jyFoCxjvvUb#correctness", "label": "Byzantine Agreement With Homonyms", "score": 25.6187534332, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "snippet": "If a process with identifier i performs Broadcast(m) in superround r \u2265 T , then every cor- rect process performs Accept(m, i) during superround r.", "size": 7, "hash": "e29a41115eaec95f8dfa700a4b186782", "id": 1}, {"samples": [{"hash": "4oX2qXoF3tp", "uri": "/contracts/4oX2qXoF3tp#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 31.3154163361, "published": true}, {"hash": "iOD6lOGcoQs", "uri": "/contracts/iOD6lOGcoQs#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7275829315, "published": true}, {"hash": "ecLtYlsB5at", "uri": "/contracts/ecLtYlsB5at#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7262153625, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-leader", "type": "definition", "offset": [15, 25]}, {"key": "parties-are", "type": "clause", "offset": [53, 64]}], "snippet": "For all ID, if the leader L is honest and all honest parties are activated on ID, all honest parties would output for ID.", "size": 3, "hash": "e01c529e26870e6e4ad2d560d8938269", "id": 2}, {"samples": [{"hash": "4dI2aycWzLM", "uri": "/contracts/4dI2aycWzLM#correctness", "label": "Independent Updates and Incremental Agreement in Replicated Databases", "score": 19.0, "published": true}, {"hash": "1Q15TJ4Zphl", "uri": "/contracts/1Q15TJ4Zphl#correctness", "label": "Independent Updates and Incremental Agreement in Replicated Databases", "score": 19.0, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "execution-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [56, 68]}, {"key": "the-execution", "type": "clause", "offset": [201, 214]}, {"key": "the-transaction", "type": "clause", "offset": [252, 267]}, {"key": "the-data", "type": "clause", "offset": [286, 294]}, {"key": "transaction-coordinator", "type": "definition", "offset": [477, 500]}], "snippet": "In this section we prove the correctness of transaction execution by proving the following theorem. Theorem 1 Transaction execution preserves Invariant 1. Proof By assumption the invariant held before the execution of a transaction. At all sites where the transaction is not committed, the data values, history log, and reception vectors remain unchanged. Moreover data values, history log, and reception vectors of all objects not written by the transaction remain unchanged. transaction coordinator.", "size": 3, "hash": "36d31b75681c519f96ec50265ba922e3", "id": 3}, {"samples": [{"hash": "UcAmMEqhdo", "uri": "/contracts/UcAmMEqhdo#correctness", "label": "Key Agreement", "score": 22.5421543121, "published": true}, {"hash": "9IIMAqGXcxC", "uri": "/contracts/9IIMAqGXcxC#correctness", "label": "Key Agreement", "score": 19.0, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "snippet": "If Eve is passive, then Pr[kA = kB]= 1.", "size": 3, "hash": "7f2178bf20c4f981295d20c367abfe22", "id": 4}, {"samples": [{"hash": "iOD6lOGcoQs", "uri": "/contracts/iOD6lOGcoQs#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7275829315, "published": true}, {"hash": "ecLtYlsB5at", "uri": "/contracts/ecLtYlsB5at#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7262153625, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-dealer", "type": "clause", "offset": [3, 13]}, {"key": "parties-are", "type": "clause", "offset": [76, 87]}, {"key": "the-value", "type": "clause", "offset": [177, 186]}, {"key": "equal-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [271, 279]}], "snippet": "If the dealer is honest and inputs secret m in AVSS-Sh, then: If all honest parties are activated to run AVSS-Sh on ID, all honest parties would output in the AVSS-Sh instance; The value m\u2217 reconstructed by any honest party in the corresponding AVSS-Rec instance must be equal to m, for all ID.", "size": 3, "hash": "6170d4bfc15bd150a2ebe3a7fdc625b4", "id": 5}, {"samples": [{"hash": "wet2hJDlqb", "uri": "/contracts/wet2hJDlqb#correctness", "label": "Privacy Preserving Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 28.3097877502, "published": true}, {"hash": "apEAcij3IVL", "uri": "/contracts/apEAcij3IVL#correctness", "label": "Privacy Preserving Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme", "score": 28.2933635712, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-formal", "type": "clause", "offset": [5, 15]}, {"key": "provide-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [81, 92]}, {"key": "proof-of-correctness", "type": "clause", "offset": [93, 113]}, {"key": "the-proposed-scheme", "type": "clause", "offset": [117, 136]}, {"key": "the-user", "type": "definition", "offset": [163, 171]}, {"key": "session-key", "type": "definition", "offset": [256, 267]}, {"key": "the-process", "type": "clause", "offset": [302, 313]}, {"key": "mutual-authentication", "type": "clause", "offset": [317, 338]}], "snippet": "With the formal validation tool \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587-\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587-\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Logic (BAN-logic) [27], we provide the proof of correctness of the proposed scheme in this section. Let U be the user, S represent the sensor node and GWN denote the gateway node. We demonstrate that a session key can be created successfully after the process of mutual authentication among S and U. Now, the basic notations of BAN-logic are given below: \u2022 P |\u2261 X: P believes X.", "size": 2, "hash": "a0f8ffe66c7c7d3ebafea00c3694af8b", "id": 6}, {"samples": [{"hash": "iOD6lOGcoQs", "uri": "/contracts/iOD6lOGcoQs#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7275829315, "published": true}, {"hash": "ecLtYlsB5at", "uri": "/contracts/ecLtYlsB5at#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement", "score": 22.7262153625, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "digital-signature", "type": "clause", "offset": [99, 116]}, {"key": "shares-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [216, 225]}, {"key": "the-second-party", "type": "definition", "offset": [489, 505]}, {"key": "the-commitment", "type": "clause", "offset": [691, 705]}, {"key": "chosen-by", "type": "clause", "offset": [744, 753]}], "snippet": "For proving the first part, it is clear that (i) the honest dealer must collect at least n f valid digital signature for (C ) from distinct parties to form valid \u03a0 and (ii) every honest party can eventually wait the shares of A(x) and B(x) as well as the same C . This implies that all honest parties can eventually broadcast the same Cipher messages, so they would broadcast the same Echo messages and the same Ready messages, thus finally outputting in the AVSS-Sh instance. For proving the second party, it is easy to see that (i) any honest party must output a ciphertext c same to the ciphertext computed by the honest sender and (ii) all honest parties must receive the same hash h of the commitment C to A(x), where A(x) is a polynomial chosen by the honest deader. Recall that we have proven that all honest parties can reconstruct a message c A(0), which exactly is m because c computed by the honest sender is m A(0).", "size": 2, "hash": "8b7ccae8c971e18d9a60d1cd1f8b4c47", "id": 7}, {"samples": [{"hash": "be5V6h4YZr4", "uri": "/contracts/be5V6h4YZr4#correctness", "label": "Quantum Cryptography", "score": 33.5098381042, "published": true}, {"hash": "5HLjPcIYjJs", "uri": "/contracts/5HLjPcIYjJs#correctness", "label": "Research Paper", "score": 33.4980735779, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "conclusion-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [7, 20]}, {"key": "the-protocol", "type": "clause", "offset": [21, 33]}, {"key": "both-parties-agree", "type": "clause", "offset": [35, 53]}], "snippet": "At the conclusion of the protocol, both parties agree on the output. Formally,", "size": 2, "hash": "ce85ecb058a52e82693acaa89f0a4f21", "id": 8}, {"samples": [{"hash": "lvPX4sdcoWX", "uri": "/contracts/lvPX4sdcoWX#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Reference Frame Agreement", "score": 25.2411975861, "published": true}, {"hash": "hekssnOf1Pb", "uri": "/contracts/hekssnOf1Pb#correctness", "label": "Asynchronous Reference Frame Agreement", "score": 22.7645454407, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "step-4", "type": "clause", "offset": [126, 132]}, {"key": "lemma-6", "type": "clause", "offset": [210, 217]}, {"key": "for-t", "type": "clause", "offset": [231, 236]}], "snippet": "To prove consistency we show that if a correct node Pi outputs vi and a correct node Pj outputs vj then d(vi, vj) \u2264 42\u03b4. From step 4 of Epoch 2 of A-Agree we see that, vi = wi[ki], (64) vj = wj [kj]. (65) From lemma 6 we know that for t < n/4,", "size": 2, "hash": "0514cfb369c20736bf9cc7565feec250", "id": 9}, {"samples": [{"hash": "be5V6h4YZr4", "uri": "/contracts/be5V6h4YZr4#correctness", "label": "Quantum Cryptography", "score": 33.5098381042, "published": true}, {"hash": "5HLjPcIYjJs", "uri": "/contracts/5HLjPcIYjJs#correctness", "label": "Research Paper", "score": 33.4980735779, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "serial-number", "type": "clause", "offset": [51, 64]}], "snippet": "Honestly generated money states verify under their serial number. That is,", "size": 2, "hash": "075933b26f304d24d4c239288ada0121", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "ClQSTmoVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3RzcjALEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2IhRjb3JyZWN0bmVzcyMwMDAwMDAwYQyiAQJlbhgAIAA=", "clause": {"children": [["site-failures", "Site failures"], ["after-commit", "After commit"], ["network-partition", "Network partition"], ["after-message-exchange", "After message exchange"], ["dealing-with-failures", "Dealing with failures"]], "parents": [["the-partially-synchronous-case", "THE PARTIALLY SYNCHRONOUS CASE"], ["algorithm", "Algorithm"], ["introduction", "Introduction"], ["asynchronous-agreement", "Asynchronous Agreement"], ["transaction-execution", "Transaction execution"]], "title": "Correctness", "size": 57, "id": "correctness", "related": [["correctness-of-representations", "Correctness of Representations", "<strong>Correctness</strong> of Representations"], ["accuracy", "Accuracy", "Accuracy"], ["representation", "Representation", "Representation"], ["correctness-of-representations-and-warranties", "Correctness of Representations and Warranties", "<strong>Correctness</strong> of Representations and Warranties"], ["no-representation", "No Representation", "No Representation"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-24T06:49:08+00:00", "also_ask": ["What objective standards should define 'correctness' to avoid ambiguity?", "How can parties allocate liability for incorrect information under this clause?", "What are the most effective remedies for breach of a correctness clause?", "How does this clause interact with representations and warranties in similar contracts?", "What evidence is typically required to prove a breach of the correctness clause in court?"], "drafting_tip": "Specify the standards for correctness to avoid ambiguity, require prompt notification of errors to enable timely remedies, and define consequences for breaches to ensure enforceability.", "explanation": "The Correctness clause establishes that the information, representations, or statements provided by a party are accurate and truthful. In practice, this clause typically requires each party to confirm that all facts, documents, or disclosures made in connection with the agreement are correct and not misleading. Its core function is to ensure reliability and trust between parties by holding them accountable for the accuracy of their communications, thereby reducing the risk of disputes arising from false or incomplete information."}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}