Price Competition Sample Clauses

Price Competition. The Management Committee may decide whether JDS, in the case of purchase WDM Optical Filters, or OCLI, in the case of WDM Products assembly Services, or the Company for both, may purchase WDM Optical Filters or WDM Products assembly Services from third parties (where third parties in this Agreement shall include non-wholly owned subsidiaries of either party) if it determines that the Profits would be greater.
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Price Competition. We model competition as Xxxx-Xxxxxxx with differentiated products. Consider first the case where all three firms engage in price competition in a competitive triopoly where there are no authorized generics, i.e. configuration T0. Then the profit maximizing equilib- rium prices are determined by p = c + Ω—1D(p0, p1, p2) and where Ω is a 3 × 3 matrix such that Ωij = —Oij
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Price Competition. We model competition as Xxxx-Xxxxxxx with differentiated products. Consider first the case where all three firms engage in a price competition, a competitive triopoly,
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Price Competition. We model competition as Xxxx-Xxxxxxx with differentiated products. Consider first the case when all three firms engage in a price competition, a competitive triopoly or T0 and when there are no authorized generics. Then the profit maximizing equilibrium prices are 1 15This follows from the inverse demand function in monopoly defined equivalently as p1 = α(M ) − βq1, which gives the demand function as q1 = a(M ) − b(M )p1 where a(M ) = α(M )/β and b(M ) = 1/β and then using substitution and simplification from earlier relations. Note that as long as β > γ, the WTP in triopoly is always lower than that in monopoly for all λ > 0. Further, it is decreasing function of λ. determined by p = c + Ω—1D(p1, p2, p3) and where Ω is a three by three matrix such that ∂Dj(·)
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Price Competition. 8 5.2 Competition Other Than Price.............. 9 5.3 Price of Third Party Filters or Services Included in Costs................ 9 ARTICLE VI PROFIT SHARING...................................... 9
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Price Competition. The Authority will evaluate all responses to ITCs to determine that they are fully compliant with the Authority’s requirements and that any specific requirements been accepted. Only those responses which are deemed to be compliant will be considered for a price competition. The price competition will evaluate the Platts price (based on the Platts Index detailed in the ITC), the Premium / Discount submitted by the supplier in response the requirement and, where applicable, the Authority will state in the ITC if a weighting is to be applied, in accordance with clause 12. The bids will be evaluated in terms of the lowest overall price, taking into account Platts price plus a premium / discount and, where applicable, the weighting factor. For the purpose of the price competition only, the Platts element of the overall price competition will be calculated using the Platts Index detailed in the ITC, based on the average of the mean for the month prior to the date of the competition (M-1). For requirements to deliver F-35 into the GPSS suppliers will be given the option to submit a price in Lots of 5000m³. The Authority reserves the right to award lots to more than one supplier should this result in the lowest overall price. The price competition may, at the Authority’s discretion, take the form of an Electronic Reverse Auction (ERA), further details can be found at clause 10 above. Requirements not subject to an ERA will be evaluated via a paper based ITC (issued via email). The ITC will detail the method of competition. Where a price competition is subject to an ERA the supplier’s bid submitted in response to the ITC will be the auction starting point. The Platts price and Weighting Factor, if applicable, will be fixed during the ERA and not a biddable element. The supplier’s Premium / Discount will be the only element of the overall price to be bid against at the ERA. The premium / discount will be determined by the winning bid(s) at the ERA. The lowest overall price (PLATTS plus Weighing Factor, if applicable, plus Premium / Discount) at the end of the ERA will be the winning bid. For requirements not subject to an ERA, the supplier’s bid submitted in response to the ITC will be deemed to be his best offer. The Platts price plus the supplier’s Premium / Discount and, where applicable, the Weighting Factor will be the overall price offered. The lowest overall price (PLATTS price plus Premium / Discount plus the Weighing Factor, if applicable) bid in response t...
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Price Competition. We model competition as Xxxx-Xxxxxxx with differentiated products. Consider first the case where all three firms engage in price competition in a competitive triopoly where there are no authorized generics, i.e. configuration T0. Then the profit maximizing equilib- rium prices are determined by p = c + Ω−1D(p0, p1, p2) and where Ω is a 3 × 3 matrix such that Ωij = −Oij ∂Dj(·). (20) ∂p In the equation above, Oij are terms of the ‘ownership’ matrix, set equal to the identity matrix for the baseline case of a competitive triopoly (Xxxx, 1998). Triopoly outcomes in other cases (authorized generics) are computed similarly but by adjusting the terms of the ownership matrix. For instance, when the branded firm launches an AG via the first challenger and competes with the second challenger (T1), equilibrium prices are computed by setting the off-diagonal terms for the branded and the first generic equal to one in the ownership matrix to allow for joint profit maximization between these two firms.30 In a duopoly, the pricing equation is similar except that dimensionality is reduced by one, and the ownership matrix is either equal to an identity matrix (in the D0 competitive duopoly case) or all terms are equal to one (in the D1 duopoly where the branded firm has launched an AG). Computation of equilibrium prices allows computation of quantities and firm profits. 0 29This follows from the inverse demand function in monopoly defined equivalently as p0 = α(M ) − βq0, which gives the demand function as q0 = a(M ) − b(M )p0 where a(M ) = α(M )/β and b(M ) = 1/β and then using substitution and simplification from earlier relations. Note that as long as β > γ, the WTP of the branded in triopoly is always lower than that in monopoly for all λ > 0. Further, it is decreasing function of λ. 30Similarly, our model allows for a fully collusive triopoly, i.e., the branded firm launches two AGs, and is in a ‘T2’, all terms
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Related to Price Competition

  • Non-Competition a. Executive acknowledges and recognizes the highly competitive nature of the businesses of the Company and its affiliates and accordingly agrees as follows:

  • Non-Solicitation; Non-Competition (a) Executive agrees that, during the Term and until nine (9) months after the termination of his employment, Executive will not, directly or indirectly, including on behalf of any person, firm or other entity, employ or actively solicit for employment any employee of the Company or any of its Affiliated Entities, or anyone who was an employee of the Company or any of its Affiliated Entities within the nine (9) months prior to the termination of Executive’s employment, or induce any such employee to terminate his or his employment with the Company or any of its Affiliated Entities.

  • Non-Competition; Non-Solicitation Executive acknowledges and recognizes the highly competitive nature of the businesses of the Company and its affiliates and accordingly agrees as follows:

  • Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Ancillary to the agreements to provide Executive with the Confidential Information as set forth above, and in order to aid in the enforcement of those agreements, Executive agrees that, during the Term and for a period of two (2) years after the termination of Executive’s employment with the Company (or, in the event Executive is entitled to the payments and benefits described in Section 4.3(c) for a period of one (1) year after termination of Executive’s employment with the Company) (as applicable, the “Prohibited Period”), he will:

  • Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation In consideration of the salary paid to the Executive by the Company and subject to applicable law, the Executive agrees that during the term of the Employment and for a period of one (1) year following the termination of the Employment for whatever reason:

  • Non-Competition/Solicitation To the Company’s knowledge, no Respondent is subject to any non-competition agreement or non-solicitation agreement with any employer or prior employer which could materially affect such Respondent’s ability to be and act in the capacity of a director or officer of the Company, as applicable.

  • Confidentiality, Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Employee agrees, as a condition to Employee’s employment with the Company, to execute the Company’s standard form of Employee Non-Disclosure, Invention Release and Non-Competition Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A.

  • Confidentiality Non Competition Non Solicitation A. The Executive acknowledges that:

  • Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition The Executive agrees that:

  • Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement Without the prior written consent of the Company, Employee shall not, during the term of this Agreement, or for a two (2) year period of time following the date of termination of this Agreement or the termination of Employee's employment with the Company:

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