FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. For a number of years, up to and including 2012, BNPP processed thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that involved countries, entities, and/or individuals subject to the sanctions programs administered by OFAC. BNPP appears to have engaged in a systematic practice, spanning many years and involving multiple BNPP branches and business lines, that concealed, removed, omitted, or obscured references to, or the interest or involvement of, sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar ("USD") Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") payment messages sent to U.S. financial institutions. While these payment practices occurred throughout multiple branches and subsidiaries of the bank, BNPP's subsidiary in Geneva ("BNPP Suisse") and branch in Paris ("BNPP Paris") facilitated or conducted the overwhelming majority of the apparent violations of U.S. sanctions laws described in this Agreement. The specific payment practices the bank utilized in order to process certain sanctions-related payments to or through the United States included omitting references to sanctioned parties; replacing the names of sanctioned parties with BNPP's name or a code word; and structuring payments in a manner that did not identify the involvement of sanctioned parties in payments sent to U.S.financialinstitutions.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. 2H Offshore’s seven apparent violations of the CACR involved misconduct by a former 2H Offshore Engineering Ltd. Global Director (the “Global Director”) whose oversight responsibilities included 2H KL, and 2H KL’s Technical Director (the “Technical Director”) who had oversight of the day-to-day operations of 2H KL. 2H KL’s work for Petronas involved the drafting of reports, and the Technical Director presenting a workshop in Cuba in regard to Petronas’ drilling of the Catoche-1 oil well in Cuban territorial waters. Petronas and Repsol were jointly operating the Scarabeo 9 Frigstad D90 semi- submersible drilling rig. 2H KL’s work for Repsol involved the issuance of reports in regard to Repsol’s drilling of the Jaguey-1, Yari-1, and Tayno-1 oil xxxxx in Cuban territorial waters. On November 13, 2008, the Technical Director asked the Global Director for guidance regarding a prior email he received from 2H Brazil’s director about the Catoche-1 oil well drilling project in Cuban waters that advised against engaging in any business involving Cuba because 2H Offshore was an American-owned company. The Global Director responded by forwarding an October 2007 memorandum from Acteon that specifically prohibited work or trade in Cuba even through third countries with the added statement that he did not want to turn away work from Petronas for a reason he was not sympathetic to. The Global Director advised finding a way around Acteon’s prohibition on any work involving Cuba. On the same day, the Global Director emailed 2H Offshore’s then-Managing Director and who advised that approval should be sought from Acteon’s then-Group Finance Director (the “Finance Director”). The Global Director contacted the Finance Director the next day asking for approval to work on Petronas’ project for Repsol. The ensuing conversation clearly stated the drilling activity would be conducted in Cuba. The Finance Director later responded to the Global Director and 2H Offshore’s Managing Director and stated Acteon’s prior U.S. person investor-parent had approved the work on the basis of the information provided by the Global Director with the conditions the report be marked confidential and not provided to anyone else.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. This Factual Statement is made pursuant to, and is part of, the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) dated September 7th, 2021, between the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, the United States Department of Justice, National Security Division (collectively, “DOJ”) and Xxxx Xxxxx, Xxxx Xxxxx and Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Defendants agree and stipulate that, in the event DOJ brings a deferred prosecution pursuant to the DPA (the “prosecution”): the information in this Factual Statement is true and accurate; this Factual Statement is admissible for all purposes related to the prosecution; and they will neither contest the admissibility of, nor contradict any factual assertions contained in, this Factual Statement. The parties further agree that, although each defendant individually may not have contemporaneously known all of the facts and events described in this Factual Statement, the Factual Statement correctly describes the facts and events described herein, and that the facts and events discussed in this Factual Statement occurred on or about the dates described. 1 Unless stated otherwise, the phrase “Defendants” refers to and includes all three Defendants.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. The conduct at issue herein first came to the attention of OFAC in early January 2006, when a U.S. bank blocked a transaction following receipt of a SWIFT message from ANZ Australia’s New York branch. The blocked transaction referenced the Bank of Khartoum, a Government of Sudan financial institution that is on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. In January 2001, HBEU approached HBUS with a proposal to clear U.S. dollar transactions for Bank Melli London (“Bank Melli”) through HBEU’s correspondent account with HBUS by utilizing Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) MT 202 cover payments that would not reference Bank Melli. In February 2001, HBUS concluded that the proposed transactions appeared to comply with OFAC regulations that authorized U.S. depository institutions to process certain transactions for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran where the transactions involved transfers from one third country’s account at a domestic bank to another third country’s account at a domestic bank (“U-turn” transactions). A June 2001 email from an HBEU relationship manager to members of HBUS Compliance stated: Once the proposition goes live we have instructed Bank Melli to alter the format of [its] payments to achieve straight through [processing]… we have further asked them to only put ‘One of our clients’ in field 52, thus removing the chance of them inputting an ‘Iranian referenced’ customer name, that causes fall out of the cover payment sent to HBUS and a breach of OFAC regulations.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. In August 1994, ING Bank opened the Netherlands Caribbean Bank N.V. (“NCB”), a joint venture with Cuba. The Wholesale Banking Division of ING Bank (“ING Wholesale Banking”) also opened a representative office in Havana (“ING Havana”). ING Wholesale Banking’s branch in Curacao (“ING Curacao”) processed all payment instructions on behalf of, and performed support functions for, NCB and ING Havana.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. The statements of fact as set forth herein above are true and correct.
FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. Following a request for information from OFAC, Clearstream met with OFAC in late 2007 and early 2008 to discuss accounts it maintained in Luxembourg for Iranian entities. One such account was ultimately identified as an account for the Central Bank of Iran (“CBI”).
FACTUAL STATEMENT. Internal correspondence disclosed by Keysight shows that prior to acquisition, Anite had business with Sudan, Syria, and Iran, particularly for the benefit of the South African Prior to its acquisition by Keysight, Anite communicated that it would cease all existing and future business with Sudan, Syria, and Iran. Approximately one month after acquiring Anite, on or about September 14, 2015, Keysight informed Anite that sales to Sudan, Syria, and Iran should no longer occur. Keysight thereafter reiterated its instructions to Anite regarding the prohibitions on unauthorized trade with Sudan, Syria and Iran. ector for the Middle East ice President EMEA passed in the U.A.E. egional Director ME and two other employees in the Anite Middle East office I need to advice [sic] you NOT to sell into any of In his email to the three Anite Middle East employees, the Vice President EMEA copied the Later that same day, the Regional Director ME responded to the Vice President EMEA in an email copying two of his colleagues ongoing Iranian business. The Regional Director suggested his resistance to the idea of terminating sales in Iran and with other U.S.-sanctioned countries. Evidence of this resistance continued over text message later that same evening in an exchange between the Regional Director ME and the other two employees that were copied to the reply email to the Vice President EMEA. In the text message exchange, the Regional Director ME and his two colleagues agreed that to preserve their credibility in the local market, they would by ensuring that no mention of Iran or locations in Iran would appear in correspondence. employees were not always successful in preventing mentions of Iran in their correspondence. On January 12, 2016, sent an email to the Vice President EMEA and the Regional Director ME regarding the negotiation of a sale between Anite and a Pakistani telecommunications company, and mentioned that the Pakistani company about [the] . . . Iran Pricing providing for its products. all country names. Less than two hours after receiving the email, the Regional Director ME and the business partner who sent the email exchanged communications via text message and noted they should not mention Iran in their emails and have references to Iran deleted. The Regional Director ME also expressed fear that he would lose his job or end up in jail. In his next email reply to the message regarding the Pakistani negotiations, the Regional Director ME changed the reference...
FACTUAL STATEMENT. On or about February 12, 2014, EF Data and Memotec prepared a price quote for satellite equipment under warranty, ongoing telephone support, and technical training for a Canadian Company that develops and manufactures satellite communications equipment. An April 30, 2014 sales document issued by EF Data identified the destination of the equipment as Sudan. On May 21, 2014, EF Data’s Credit Manager received a letter of credit indicating that Sudan was the final destination for the goods. EF Data’s Credit Manager responded to the letter of credit via email by stating, “I have reviewed the attached [Letter of Credit] and have several questions. What is the ultimate destination of this order? From the statement on page 5, it appears that it is Sudan. If so, we may have export issues with this.” This email to the Canadian Company also copied (1) EF Data’s then Director of Sales for Canada and the United States,
