Aiding and Abetting. The parties to this agreement hereby agree that no party hereto may accomplish indirectly, whether through aiding and abetting of some other person, participation in some other entity, or any other conduct, that which the party is prohibited from doing directly under this Agreement, and that any such attempt shall be considered a breach of this Agreement as if such party had taken such action itself.
Aiding and Abetting. The provisions of this Sub-section shall apply to aiding and abetting of the offences referred to in Article 10.54.
Aiding and Abetting. The Executive and the Company agree that no party to ------------------- this Agreement may accomplish indirectly, whether through aiding and abetting of some other person, participation in some other entity, or any other conduct, that which the party is prohibited from doing directly under this Agreement; and that any such attempt shall be considered a breach of this Agreement as if such party had taken such action itself.
Aiding and Abetting. International and domestic courts have often looked to the NMT judgments for guidance concerning aiding and abetting, but they have rarely done so accurately. To begin with, courts have often misunderstood how the tribunals distinguished between different modes of participation. In Čelebići, for example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber cited High Command for the idea that a Chief of Staff could be held “directly liable for aiding and abetting” if he was involved in drafting illegal orders issued by his commanding officer.137 In fact, all of the tribunals considered such drafting as a form of ordering, not as aiding and abetting – a difference that could have a significant impact at sentencing. The ICTY Trial Chamber made a similar error in Furundžija, using Fendler’s conviction in Einsatzgruppen to argue that the tribunals adopted a “substantial effect” test for the actus reus of aiding and abetting. In fact, Xxxxxxx was convicted because he took a consenting part in the extermination program, not because he aided and abetted it. Furundžija’s problems, however, go beyond eliding the difference between aiding and abetting and taking a consenting part. The Trial Chamber also failed to recognize that, as discussed in Chapter 12, the tribunals treated aiding and abetting as a form of participation in a criminal enterprise, not as an independent mode of participation in a crime. If the principles were the same, the mistake would be unimportant. But they are not: the tribunals not only held that the actus reus of enterprise liability was satisfied by any contribution to the enterprise, they also limited enterprise liability to defendants who possessed sufficient “authority and discretion” regarding their actions. Having a “substantial effect” on a crime would thus not have been enough for the tribunals to hold a defendant responsible for participating in a criminal enterprise; indeed, although Xxxxxxxx von Krosigk “furnished the means by which the concentration camps were purchased, constructed, and maintained” – clearly a substantial effect – the Ministries tribunal acquitted him because he had no discretion concerning the funds he disbursed. Domestic courts have also incorrectly found a substantial-effect requirement for aiding and abetting in the NMT judgments – often, not surprisingly, by simply citing Furundžija. An example is In re South African Apartheid Litigation,138 which also erroneously used Xxxxxx’x acquittal in Ministries to claim that the provision of “f...
